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THE COMPLEXITY AND LEGITIMACY OF
CORPORATE LAW
ERic W. ORTs*
The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the
greatest possible complexity; and therefore no simple disposition or
direction of power can be suitable, either to man's nature, or the
quality of his affairs.'
I like complexity and contradiction.... I speak of ai complex and
contradictory architecture based on the richness and ambiguity of
modem experience....
... By embracing contradiction as well as complexity, I aim for
vitality as well as validity.2
A central question when considering "new directions in corporate law"
is the degree to which the study of corporate law continues to take account
of the complexity of its subject. Certain contemporary academic trends are,
on the contrary, leading to a simplification of vision and understanding
when movement in precisely the opposite direction is needed. In particular,
the influence of economic theories of the firm, and translations of these
theories into a slogan that defines "the corporation" as merely "a nexus
of contracts," threaten to extend a reductionist mode of thinking to areas
of corporate law where such models are often not only unhelpful, but
destructive. Instead, building a "nonreductionist" model that allows for the
complexity of corporate law is essential.3
* Nelson Peltz Term Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania. This Article was prepared for presentation at the "New Directions
in Corporate Law" conference sponsored by Washington and Lee University School of Law in
Lexington, Virginia, November 5-6, 1993. It was also written in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the J.S.D. degree in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. I thank the
participants in the Washington and Lee conference, especially Dean Karen Newman, whose
paper for the conference served as the initial inspiration for this Article, as well as Alan Wolfe
and Ronald Green. I also thank the participants in presentations given to the Department of
Legal Studies at Wharton and to Rutgers-Newark School of Law. Specific comments from
Steve Balnbridge, Bernie Black, Bill Bratton, Al Conard, Tom Dunfee, Richard Shell, and
Aidan Synnott were very helpful, and any remaining errors are mine. Richard Walder provided
timely research assistance. Janet Burns contributed some good books and substantial moral
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1. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 74 (Anchor Books
1973) (1790).
2. ROBERT VENTURr, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE 16 (2d ed.
1977).
3. Cf. Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 68, 68,
86-91 (1991) (describing "law's functional multiplicity, as well as the jurisprudential implications
of that multiplicity" in terms of three models or "accounts" of law-dispute resolution,
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In this Article, I suggest in Part I that recent attempts to define or
formulate a unified theory of "the corporation" fail to account for the
complexity of corporate law. Following H.L.A. Hart, I argue that it is a
mistake to begin theoretical thinking about corporate law with the question,
"What is a corporation?" This approach is fraught with analytical difficulty
and leads easily to error because of the temptation to impose an initial
theory or definition of "the corporation" on a multifaceted corpus of law.
Part II considers positive corporate law in terms of its technical com-
plexity. It attempts to answer the large but manageable question, "What is
corporate law about?" In Part II, I review descriptive theories of mandatory,
suppletory, and enabling rules in corporate law and provide an overview of
some of the basic substantive law. I conclude that corporate law is primarily
about the structuring of economic power of businesses that "incorporate"
(that is, register under state corporate codes) to secure such advantages as
convenience, financial flexibility, and limited liability. I conclude also that
the legal meaning and scope of the term "corporation" depends inextricably
on the kind of question being asked, and different legal questions yield
different answers in different contexts.
Part III then considers the normative complexity implicit in corporate
law. I argue that one cannot reduce the subject of corporate law to one
normative value, such as an economic objective. Instead, other values
inaccessible to a purely economic measure, such as following the law and
ethical behavior, remain important. Moreover, the economic objective of
corporate law is not unidimensional, but divided within itself. Corporate
law involves the simultaneous pursuit and coexistence of a number of ends
or purposes, with the mix and predominance of different values depending
on particular legal contexts.
Finally, Part IV offers a theory of corporate law to combat simplistic
models that have become influential. This theory provides a realistic and
workable alternative that takes account of the complexity in corporate law.
By "complexity," I do not mean the theory itself is complicated or corporate
law is too complicated to understand.4 Instead, I argue that corporate law
coordination, and meliorative/social justice and order-and arguing in favor of a "nonreduc-
tionist alternative" that includes all three). Following this approach responds to Alan Wolfe's
admonition: "A system of legal rules ought to recognize the world that it regulates. If the
world is complex, the legal rules should be complex." Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation:
Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1673, 1696 (1993).
4. As discussed in the text, I am concerned here primarily with two kinds of complexity
in corporate law: the technical or descriptive complexity of positive corporate law, and the
normative complexity that informs corporate law. In addition, what might be called "situational
complexity" describes the circumstances facing managers of many large businesses. This kind
of complexity is a type of "social complexity" discussed by social scientists. See, e.g., Harlan
Wilson, Complexity as a Theoretical Problem, in ORGANIZED SocIAL. COMLExITY: CHALLENGE
TO POLMCS AND POLICY 281, 282 & n.2 (Todd R. LaPorte ed., 1975) (distinguishing at least
five types of structural complexity: institutional, situational, analytical, ecological, and techno-
logical). Herbert Simon, for example, describes the situational complexity faced by decision-
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is complex because it embodies a set of conflicting normative principles. I
argue further that the normative complexity of corporate law explains, at
least in part, its technical complexity. This view supplies a strong theoretical
underpinning for corporate law as long as its rules and principles, and their
application, meet basic conditions of legal and political legitimacy. And the
legitimacy of corporate law, I argue finally, does not require choosing
between either an exclusively "economic" or an exclusively "political"
model. Corporate law retains legitimacy to the extent that it continues to
be created and maintained through sound processes of law-making and law-
applying. The technical and normative complexity of corporate law is
legitimate, in other words, in accordance with the quality of the deliberative
procedures of democratic government and judicial administration.
I. THE POVERTY OF LEGAL THEORIEs OF THE CORPORATION
Currently, prevalent theoretical approaches to thinking about corporate
law begin with its ostensible subject, namely, "the corporation." These
approaches begin with the question, "What is the corporation?" Responses
vary. Without pausing to discuss the different approaches in detail, some
theorists answer that the corporation is a legal fiction. Others claim the
corporation is created only by a "concession" of rights to a business
"entity" by the political state.5 Still others respond that the concession
makers in terms of "bounded rationality":
The bounded rationality of humans does not allow us to grasp the complex situations
that provide the environments for our actions in their entirety. The first step in
rational action is to focus attention on specific (strategic) aspects of the total situation,
and to form a model of the situation in terms of those aspects that lie in that focus
of attention. Rational computation takes place in the context of this model, rather
than in the response to the whole external reality.
Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, 5 J. EcoN. PERsP. 25, 37 (1991); see also
DANmo ZoLo, DEMOCRACY AND ComrLnxrry: A REALiST APPROACH 2-3 (David McKie trans.,
1992) (describing complexity as "the cognitive situation in which agents, whether they are
individuals or social groups, find themselves. The relations which agents construct and project
on their environment in their attempts at self-orientation-i.e., at arrangement, planning,
manipulation-will be more or less complex according to circumstances.") I refer to this kind
of complexity below, infra notes 119-20, 128-29 and accompanying text, and Part III.A.2, in
connection with the difficulty of making business judgments about short-term and long-term
strategies and tradeoffs.
Although situational and other types of social complexity may lead to certain kinds of
policy recommendations with respect to the substance of corporate law, and thus may serve as
an additional normative value implicit in corporate law in certain contexts, I avoid confronting
here many sorts of social complexity. For an introduction to the complexity of the idea of
social complexity, see Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PRoc. AM. PmL.
Soc'y 467 (1962). In addition, I do not use the term complexity to refer to the emerging
"science" of complexity or complexity theory, although these ideas may have some application
to thinking about corporate law. For an introduction, see M. MrrcHEL WALDROP, COMPI'.Xr :
THE EMERGinG SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992).
5. Contemporary commentators largely discount the concession theory for its failure to
account for economic reality. See, e.g., ROBERT HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CoRPORATiON 2-
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theory does not comport with modern economic reality. Instead, they
advance a "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation, arguing that the
corporation is merely the aggregate of the many contractual relationships
of which it is composed. 6 From the contractarian perspective, the important
issue for corporate law becomes how to hold corporate "agents," namely,
directors and managers, accountable to their "principals," namely, share-
holders and debtholders.7 Another approach emphasizes a trust law analogy,
with directors and managers cast as "trustees" for shareholder "benefici-
aries." ' Alternatively, a different type of contractarian -theory adopts a
broad definition of relevant interests of the corporate "constituency." The
important issue for corporate law then becomes how to make corporate
trustees, again the directors and managers, take into account the interests
22 (1979); William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CoRNELu L. Ray. 407, 434-36 (1989). However, the concession theory of the
corporation apparently remains persuasive to some, for example, the United States Supreme
Court. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (quoting with
approval Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819))
(corporation as "mere creature of law"); cf. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Cm. L. Rv.
187, 188 (1991) ("The Anglo-American corporate form is a creation of the state, conceived
originally as a privilege to be conferred on specified entities for the public good and welfare.").
6. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. EcoN. 305, 310 (1976) ("Contractual
relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers,
creditors, etc.... It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legalfictions
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals") (footnotes
omitted). A number of legal commentators have adopted variations on this theme. A leading
example is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 CoLUM. L.
Rav. 1416 (1989):
The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law
enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets
of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy.
Id. at 1418; see also FAN K H. EASTERBROOK & D m R. FIsCHEL, Tm ECONOlWC STRUCTRE
oF CoRaoATE LAW (1991):
[W]e often speak of the corporation as a "nexus of contracts" or a set of implicit
and explicit contracts. This reference, too, is shorthand for the complex arrangements
of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out
among themselves. The form of reference is a reminder that the corporation is a
voluntary adventure, and that we must always examine the terms on which real people
have agreed to participate.
id. at 12.
7. Jensen and Meckling adopt this perspective in their original formulation. Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 6, at 308-10, 312-13, 327-29, 333-34, 357. For a critical description of
this approach, see Bratton, supra note 5, at 417-19. For comprehensive application of the basic
principles of this perspective, taking account of the complexities involved in the contemporary
context of institutional investors, see Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise
of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Ray. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MicH. L. Rav. 520 (1990).
8. See, e.g., In re USACafes L.P. Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,056, at 90,322, 90,325 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1991) ("corporate directors, even though
not strictly trustees, were early on regarded. as fiduciaries for corporate stockholders").
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of their beneficiaries, which may include both shareholders and other groups,
such as the corporation's employees. 9
Although many different theories of the corporation are advanced, all
seem to suffer from beginning with a general theory of the corporation.
An important recent example is the fashionable idea of viewing the corpo-
ration as a "nexus of contracts." Although it remains persuasive for some,
leading legal scholars discredit the theory.'0 Dean Robert Clark demonstrates
that a corporation cannot be considered a nexus of actual legal contracts,
and metaphorical thinking about "implicit or standardized" contracts is
"troublesome" and "treacherous."" Along similar lines, other scholars
point out that contractarian theories of the corporation fail to account for
many "mandatory rules" of corporate law.' 2 These theories also fail to
account for the important role that courts must play in enforcing contracts
allowed by "enabling rules," not to mention the role of state legislatures. 3
Further, Clark and others dispose of the theory that one can properly
consider managers and directors of a corporation as legal "agents" of
shareholders. This influential theory, originating in theories of finance, is
incorrect as a matter of positive corporate law.'
4
9. See, e.g., David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. Rav. 223 (1991);
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REy. 1189 (1991); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21
STorsoN L. REv. 45 (1991).
10. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLum. L. REv. 1403 (1985); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary
Duties, in PINcIPALS AND AGENTs: TBE SmRucruan OF BusumSS 55-79 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919 (1988);
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 CoLum. L. Rav. 1449 (1989).
11. Clark, supra note 10, at 59-71; see also Jean Braucher, Contract versus Contractari-
anism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 697, 698 (1990) (noting
that "difficulty is presented by the fact that contractarian theorists to some extent use the idea
of contract metaphorically").
12. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1461 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporation Law, 89 CoLuM.
L. REv. 1549 (1989). But see, e.g., Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The
Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1599, 1599-1602, 1616 (1989)
(arguing that many "mandatory" rules may be avoided, although admitting that some mandatory
rules are desirable "when externalities are present").
13. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:
An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 CoLum. L. Rav. 1618 (1989).
14. In Clark's words,
A review of elementary corporate law shows that [the] power of the principal to
direct the activities of the agent does not apply to the stockholders as against the
directors or officers of their corporation. By statute in every state, the board of
directors of a corporation has the power and duty to manage or supervise its business.
The stockholders do not. To appreciate the point fully, consider the following
activities: setting the ultimate goal of the corporation-for example, whether its legal
purpose will be to maximize profits; choosing the corporation's line of business-for
1993] 1569
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In short, a survey of competing theories of "the corporation" leaves
one to conclude that none has survived intact. 15 It is worth inquiring whether
this failure of theory is not endemic to its topic. 6 Given the general failure
of attempts to construct a unified theory of the corporation, I do not
propose to start with any particular theory of the corporation. Perhaps it
is wiser to step back from the fray and reconsider whether such a theory
is helpful or even possible.
In this connection, it is useful to dust off a neglected but important
article by H.L.A. Hart.' 7 In his inaugural lecture, Definition and Theory
example, whether it will engage in retailing general merchandise or refining oil; hiring
and firing the full-time executives who will actually run the company; and exercising
supervisory power with respect to the day-to-day operations of the business. Stock-
holders of a large scale corporation do not do these things; as a matter of efficient
operation of a large firm with numerous residual claimants they should not do them;
and under the typical corporate statute and case law they cannot do them.
Clark, supra note 10, at 56-57; see also Brudney, supra note 10, at 1428-30.
Strictly economic theories of agency may be distinguished, however, and then applied as
a matter of policy in enacting or interpreting positive corporate law. See, e.g., Black, Agents
Watching Agents, supra note 7; Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamied, supra note 7.
15. I do not propose to prove this conclusion in detail here. For a critique of leading
corporate legal theories, see Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law,
97 HARv. L. REv. 1276, 1305-77 (1984). Professor Frug usefully distinguishes among (1)
"formalist" models that involve "agency" and "trustee" theories, (2) "expertise" models that
involve reliance on professional corporate management, (3) "judicial review" models that rely
on the power of courts to oversee corporate actions and decisionmaking, and (4) "market" or
"pluralist" models that rely on either "the discipline of the market" or "demands of the
political process" to control the growth and power of corporate bureaucracies. Id. Unfortunately,
after rejecting all of these models, Frug adopts the impossible view that corporate bureaucracies
represent a "form of human domination" that must be wholly overthrown and replaced. Id.
at 1277-78. Following Max Weber and other authorities that Frug cites, but whose arguments
he then ignores, I would argue instead that large corporations, and the bureaucracies they often
entail, are "realities of a modern, complex society." See id. at 1280 & n.13. Given the productive
capacities of "scale and scope" of large enterprises, not to mention the social power they
represent, large corporate enterprises are here to stay. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCALE
AND ScoPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 1-46 (1990) (describing the rise of modern
industrial enterprise and the economic efficiencies involved). The relevant question then becomes
how best to deal with them legally and as a matter of public policy. For further discussion, see
infra Part III.A.3.
Nevertheless, Frug's analysis of corporate legal theory deserves to be taken more seriously
than it has been. With Dean Clark, I would argue that the truth lies in a complex combination
of the various theories outlined and criticized by Frug. See Frug, supra, at 1377 n.356 ("Robert
Clark's forthcoming corporate law treatise is premised on the assertion that corporate law can
be made coherent through some combination of all four models .. "); see also ROBERT C.
CLARK, COaPOa-E LAW 32 (1986) ("if presented and understood properly, the numerous topics
dealt with in corporate law courses can be seen to form a surprisingly unified and coherent
whole").
16. Although I quickly dismiss many theories of the corporation (including "aggregate"
theories, "entity" theories, "realist" theories, and others) without extended treatment, I hope
it will become apparent in the discussion below why, as an analytical matter, theories are likely
to fail when they begin with the question, "What is the corporation?"
17. H.L.A. HART, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 21-48 (1983).
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in Jurisprudence, delivered at Oxford in 1953, Hart reviews "three great
theories of corporate personality, each of which has dealt deadly blows to
the other."'" According to each theory, a corporation is rightly considered
(a) "really just a collective name or abbreviation for some complex but still
plain facts about ordinary persons," (b) "the name of a fictitious person,"
or (c) "the name of a real person existing with a real will and life, but not
a body of its own."' 19 Hart argues that these concepts of the corporation,
classified in his time as "Fiction or Realist or Concessionist" theories, do
not help t6 clarify thinking about corporate law.20 Instead, they represent
"a criss-cross between logical and political criteria. ' 2'
Perhaps theoretical thinking about corporate law has not progressed
much beyond the debates of the early 1950s. The recently minted nexus of
contracts theory of the corporation, for example, sounds very similar to
some of the theories Hart describes.22 And contemporary debates over
theories of the corporation remain political, often to the exclusion of careful'
legal analysis. Professor Victor Brudney observes, for example, that the
ascendant "rhetoric of contract" in corporate theory "serves an ideological
purpose," namely, to establish business corporations as exclusively "pri-
vate" as opposed to "public" institutions. 23
Inevitably, ideological baggage appears on the ground floor of any.
corporate theory if the first question asked is "What is a corporation?"
The problem with beginning in this fashion, according to Hart, is that
"though these theories spring from the effort to define notions actually
involved in the practice of a legal system, they rarely throw light on the
precise work they do there." 24 Theories of the corporation abstracted from
the practical reality of corporate law risk falling to describe the phenomenon
they wish to define in advance. Instead, Hart continues, words like "cor-
18. Id. at 24.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id.
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting some of the leading contractarian
theories of the corporation).
23. Brudney, supra note 10, at 1408-09. In a study of the relatively new corporate
constituency statutes, I also found the academic debate heavily rhetorical and result-oriented.
Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 14, 16-18, 71-84 (1992).
I do not discuss here whether or to what extent the "public/private" distinction is helpful
in thinking about the structure of corporate law. Other contributions have placed some reliance
on this approach. See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 3. But see Christopher D. Stone, Corporate
Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1441,
1506 (1982) (arguing that "the weight once accorded public/private is in fact lessening" in part
because "private business corporations are being treated increasingly like public bodies" through
regulation of their activities). In constitutional law, the public/private distinction makes more
sense, although it is not without difficulty. See Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and
Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987).
24. HART, supra note 17, at 25.
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poration" are in legal practice "very often . . . neutral between competing
theories." ' 25 Corporate theorists who prefabricate various versions of "the
corporation" separate themselves from the world of practice and "stand
apart with their heads at least in the clouds." 26
Beginning with a definition or theory of the corporation is not especially
helpful because the idea of a corporation is a complex one that presupposes
a legal system. To say "corporation" is not like saying "chair" or "dog."
The reality to which "corporation" refers is more complex than an easily
identifiable material thing or animal, and any attempt to force a precon-
ceived theory on a complex legal reality results in what Hart calls "contri-
vances varying with tastes." 27 The idea of the corporation is complex
precisely because it involves various relationships that presuppose the rules
and principles, and methods of enforcement and compliance, that compose
a legal system. 28 Describing the corporation, therefore, should not begin
with a definition of what a corporation is.
To illustrate, Hart gives examples of terms used in games. In a game
of cards, what is a "trick"? A good, simple explanation is as follows:
"When you have a game and among its rules is one providing that when
each of [the] players has played a card then the player who has put down
the highest card scores a point, in these circumstances that player is said
to have 'taken a trick."' 29 This explanation does not resort to a definition
or synonym for "trick." One must instead explain the idea in terms of the
rules of the game in which it is used. Hart makes fun of those who may
insist on a more precise definition of a "trick," and the parallel to similar
attempts to define a "corporation" is obvious:
Suppose now that after such an explanation [a] questioner presses
on: 'That is all very well, that explains "taking a trick"; but I still
want to know what the word "trick" means just by itself. I want
a definition of "trick"; I want something which can be substituted
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. In Hart's words,
[I]f applied to legal words like ... 'corporation' the common mode of definition
suggests that these words, like ordinary words, stand for or describe some thing,
person, quality, process, or event; when the difficulty of finding these becomes




Consider [the] statement] made on a particular occasion by a judge or an ordinary
lawyer.... such as . . . 'A & Company, Ltd. have a contract with B.' It is obvious
that the use of [this] sentence] silently assumes a special and very complicated setting,
namely the existence of a legal system with all that this implies by way of general
obedience, the operation of the sanctions of the system, and the general likelihood
that this will continue. But though this complex situation is assumed in the use of
[this] statementfl ... [it does] not state that it exists.
Id. at 27.
29. Id. at 33.
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for it whenever it is used.' If we yield to this demand for a single-
word definition we might reply: 'The trick is just a collective name
for the four cards.' But someone may object: 'The trick is not just
a name for the four cards because these four cards will not always
constitute a trick. It must therefore be some entity to which the
four cards belong.' A third might say: 'No, the trick is a fictitious
entity which the players pretend exists and to which by a fiction
which is part of the game they ascribe the cards.' But in so simple
a case we would not tolerate these theories, fraught as they are
with mystery and empty of any guidance as to the use made of the
word within the game .... 10
Hart also employs examples from the game of cricket, 31 but let me
translate Hart's examples freely in terms of American baseball.
What is a baseball team? Or, to be more concrete, what are the
Philadelphia Phillies? One answer is that the Phillies consist of about thirty
or thirty-five players. Counting up the players on the team provides an
"aggregate" theory of the Phillies. For some purposes, this description is
perfectly sufficient. However, an aggregate definition of the PhiUies cannot
explain how the Phillies are said to "score runs" during a game. Instead,
one must resort to a description of the rules of the game and how various
acts by members of the Philadelphia team can combine to "score runs"
(for example, by one batter hitting a triple and another hitting a single or
"sacrifice fly" to "score" the runner by advancing him "home"). In this
description, the Phillies do not act individually or in the aggregate. Instead,
they act as a unified team to achieve one of the basic objectives of the
game, namely, scoring runs.
Consider also the example Hart gives of an "out. ' 32 One cannot define
an out in cricket, or in baseball, except in terms of the rules of the game.
One must explain how a player is out (and called out by an umpire). In
baseball, a hitter is called out if he or she hits a ball into the air and it is
caught "on the fly" by a defensive player, or if the hitter hits a "ground
ball" which is thrown to first base before the hitter runs there, or if the
hitter is "tagged" or "forced out" at another base, or if the hitter gets
three "strikes" ("strike" is also described in terms of the rules of the game,
that is, a pitch swung at, but not hit, Or a pitch thrown in the "strike
zone"-another explanation needed!e-but not swung at or hit "fair"). An
"out," in other words, cannot be easily defined. It is a complex idea that
makes sense only in the context of a system of rules. It must be explained
in context to be understood.
The point of these examples is not to argue in favor of aggregate or
entity, or fictional or realist, theories of either baseball teams or corpora-
tions. The point is rather that these kinds of theories are senseless or at
30. Id. Hart follows Wittgenstein in using games as an aid to philosophical analysis. See,
e.g., RAY MoNx, LUDWIG WITTUENSTEIN: THE Dury oF GENIus 336-46 (discussing Wittgenstein's
use of language games as technique for "dissolving philosophical confusion").
31. HART, supra note 17, at 27-30.
32. Id.
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least irresolvable as long as they fail to take into account the complex rule-
oriented context in which they are used. It is dangerous and misleading to
speak of "a corporation" as if it is severable from the legal system to
which it is essentially related and outside of which it cannot properly be
understood.
3
Following Hart's advice, then, I do not begin with the question, "What
is a corporation?" This is the cardinal error committed by many contem-
porary theorists of the corporation, and I specifically want to avoid it.
Although beginning study of a subject by trying to define it may sound
like common sense, Hart demonstrates that some complex legal ideas are
not amenable to this approach, and the idea of the corporation is one of
them. 34 Because consideration of the corporation cannot be divorced from
its legal context, my analysis instead begins with a brief description of the
technical rules of positive corporate law.
II. TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY: THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE POWER
Like baseball, corporate law is composed of complex rules. 5 Some
writers who purport to define the nature of the corporation or to advance
theories of the corporation apparently do not know the "rules of the game"
they are discussing. Some are economists who have not bothered to study
the sometimes difficult rules of corporate law.3 6 Others are social gadflies
33. As Hart writes,
Here can be seen the essential elements of the language of legal corporations. For in
law, the lives of ten men that overlap but do not coincide may fall under separate
rules under which they have separate rights and duties, and then they are a collection
of individuals for the law; but their actions may fall under rules of a different kind
which make what is to be done by any one or more of them depend in complex
ways on what was done or occurred earlier. And then we may speak in appropriately
unified ways of the sequence so unified, using a terminology like that of corporation
law which will show that it is this sort of rule we are applying to the facts. But here
the unity of the rule may mislead us when we come to define this terminology. It
may cast a shadow: we may look for an identical continuing thing or person or
quality in the sequence. We may find it-in 'corporate spirit.' This is real enough;
but it is a secret of success not a criterion of identity.
Id. at 30.
34. Some "fundamental legal notions" cannot "be defined, only described." Id. at 47
(citing JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1875) and JAMEs BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY
AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901)).
35. Anyone who doubts the rules of baseball are complex should attempt to explain them
to a foreign observer. The rules of corporate law are somewhat more complex than those of
baseball.
36. Corporate lawyers have, for the most part, returned the favor. Professor Robert
Hamilton, the Reporter for the widely influential Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA), has reflected on the slight influence of economists in the drafting process as follows:
Economists have developed quite a different theory of state corporation statutes
[compared to the legal theories informing the drafters of the RMBCA, namely, the
ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws]. According to them, the purpose of a
corporation statute is to serve as a substitute for private contract: in other words, a
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who speak of corporations as if they are hulking artificial monsters roaming
the social landscape, but who have little clear idea of the legal term,
"corporation," they so easily bandy about.37
This Part briefly outlines some of the basic areas of corporate law and
some of its leading positive legal principles. My purpose is to provide an
overview of the complex nature of the relationships about which corporate
law is concerned and to survey some useful ways to think about the different
kinds of rules that compose corporate law.
At the outset, it is important to point out that corporate law is not
only complex in the way that some adherents of the nexus of contracts
theory see it as complex. Professors Jensen and Meckling, for example,
describe this complexity in the following terms:
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is
also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on
the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally
be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals....
There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relation-
ships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the
owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of
output.38
Although it is a truism that corporate law concerns relationships of indi-
viduals, often a multitude of individuals, who are grouped into various
categories including shareholders, creditors, employees, managers, and di-
rectors, Jensen and Meckling adopt a seriously flawed understanding of
corporate law. To be sure, a legal analysis can proceed from group to
corporation statute should not be regulatory at all, but, instead, should be an
efficiency-creating device that avoids costs associated with drafting and redrafting
recurrent provisions by codifying these provisions.
The economist's approach toward corporation statutes is certainly not the theory
on which the RMBCA was drafted. This theory was never expressly considered or
explored by the Committee on Corporate Laws during the drafting process. Further,
I suspect that most practicing attorneys would not accept the underlying premise of
this argument that corporations are purely contractual in nature. Contract-type
argument were raised by Committee members in a number of contexts.... But all
members appeared to recognize that although corporation law obviously does have
contractual aspects, some regulation was necessary.
Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEx. L. Rnv. 1455, 1467 (1985) (explanation
added).
37. These commentators pick up on Justice Brandeis's description of the "corporate
system" as "the Frankenstein Monster which states have created by their corporation laws,"
but do not bother to understand the specific context of the "race of laxity" about which he
was speaking. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933); see also ALFRED F.
CONARD, COPORATIONS IN PERSPEcTrvE 441 (1976) (describing Herman Kahn's view that
"corporations appeared as the monster that preempts most of the nation's productive resources,
and spews out its capricious variety of goods and services") (citing HEanAN KA-IN, THE FUrUaR
OF TH ColPoATION (1973)).
38. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 311 (emphasis and footnote deleted).
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group: from considering the rights of shareholders, to the rights of man-
agers, to the rights of creditors, to the rights of employees. But this is
precisely the kind of approach that Hart warns vehemently against, because
it assumes a certain theory of the corporation, in this case, an aggregate
theory that a corporation is merely the sum of its parts or groups of parts-
a nexus of contracts. It reduces a corporation to the individual "rights" of
its component membersY9 This approach is wrong-headed because, by
focusing on the trees, it misses the forest that is corporate law.
Before proceeding to a view of the corporate forest, it is important to
note also that even with respect to the component corporate trees, the
approach advocated by Jensen and Meckling and those who follow them
seems based on a rather rudimentary understanding of contract law, with
little or no reference to corporate law.40 The nexus of contracts approach
39. Definition of "rights" has difficulties similar to definition of a "corporation." Talk
of "rights" is sensible only in the context of an effectively functioning legal system. See HART,
supra note 17, at 27. "Rights" in this context refers, of course, to legal rights rather than
moral or human rights. For Hart's discussion of the latter, see H.L.A. HART, Between Utility
and Rights, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198-222 (1983); H.L.A. Hart, Are
There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. Ray. 175 (1955).
40. In a footnote to the passage quoted above, see supra text accompanying note 38,
Jensen and Meckling elaborate on the role of law in their theory of the firm as follows:
This view of the firm points up the important role which the legal system and
the law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic activity.
Statutory laws sets [sic] bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals and
organizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution. The police powers of
the state are available and used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce
the collection of damages for non-performance. The courts adjudicate conflicts
between contracting parties and establish precedents which form the body of common
law. All of these government activities affect both the kinds of contracts executed
and the extent to which contracting is relied upon. This in turn determines the
usefulness, productivity, profitability and viability of various forms of organization.
Moreover, new laws as well as court decisions often can and do change the rights of
contracting parties ex post, and they can and do serve as a vehicle for redistribution
of wealth.
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 311 n.14. This footnote is fascinating in light of the
influence this article has had on legal thinking. Note first that a common-law view of the
development of contract is adopted to the exclusion of the most important body of statutory
law in the commercial area, namely, the Uniform Commercial Code. Also absent is any
recognition of the complexity of contract law, with its various substantive and procedural
limitations. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 10, at 936-39; see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, Tan
Lnars oF FREEDOM oF CoNmAcT 23-163, 188-240 (1993) (discussing policy modifications of
contract law concerning "commodifieation," "externalities," "coercion," "imperfect informa-
tion," "paternalism," and "discrimination"); Braucher, supra note 11, at 712-38 (discussing
normative limits to contractual bargaining regarding "consent," "interpretation," and "supply-
ing terms"). More importantly, a striking omission in this "legal" footnote in a leading theory
of the corporation is any mention of corporate law! In fairness, note that Jensen and Meckling
later provide some discussion of the "limited liability" granted by corporate law. Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 6, at 331-32. For a contractarian account of corporate law giving an
extended account of the role of limited liability, see EAsTEREROOK & FIscanL, Tan EcONOlWC
STRUCTURE OF CoPoRATE LAW, supra note 6, at 40-62 (describing limited liability as "a
distinguishing feature of corporate law-perhaps the distinguishing feature").
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therefore often fails to account for important legal differences within groups.
Shareholders, for example, are of different types. They are either voting or
nonvoting and possess different kinds of rights according to the type or
"class" of their stock. 41 Creditors also fall into different legally defined
categories: general or secured, senior or junior, commercial (short-term) or
investment Gong-term). 42 Bonds, debentures, and notes come in a host of
varieties with different kinds of covenants and restrictions.43 Employees are
at different levels. They are managers or rank-and-file workers, career-
oriented or independent contractors, unionized or nonunionized. Even di-
rectors of the board are grouped in different categories for legal purposes:
outside so-called "independent" directors or inside "executive" directors.
44
All of these important legal distinctions, supplied not only by contract but
also in large part by corporate law, as well as labor, securities, bankruptcy,
and tax law, are too often overlooked in contractarian theories. As a result,
these theories present an oversimplified picture of "the corporation."
The forest of corporate law is not focused fundamentally on the
participants in a business, "enabling" them to make contracts together and
somehow providing a convenient central "nexus" around which a "corpo-
rate contract" revolves. This description provides a normative model for
what some believe the specific content corporate law should be, but it does
not describe the reality of what corporate law is. Instead, I propose the
following general description of the nature of corporate law: Corporate
law, like most law, is primarily about the rule-oriented structuring of social
power, and it is specifically about the rules that structure the organization
of economic power. Corporate law is primarily concerned with business,
that is, the structure of economic power in the form of its institutions and
processes. 45 Its subject is not primarily economics, although economic policy
41. See, e.g., EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TuREzYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CoRPoRAnoN LAW: FuNDAMENTALs 254-72 (1993) (quoting and discussing DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1983) and describing different classes of stock allowable under Delaware
law).
42. See, e.g., WILuis A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFM, JR., BusiaNss ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 6-7, 54-55, 244-45 (5th ed. 1993); BAYLESS MANNING & JM.ss J. HANIKS, LEGAL CA PAL
98-102 (3d ed: 1990).
43. See, e.g., KLIN & COFFEE, supra note 42, at 235-53; MANNING & HANKS, supra note
42, at 103-13; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW.
413, 423-31 (1986).
44. The outside/inside distinction is essential in the United States. In some parts of
Europe, notably Germany, there is an important distinction in a two-tier system of corporate
governance-between supervisory directors and managing directors. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conard,
The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in European
Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. Rnv. 1459, 1461-67 (1984); see also Christian
J. Meier-Schatz, Corporate Governance and Legal Rules: A Transnational Look at Concepts
'and Problems of Internal Management Control, 13 J. CORP. L. 431, 442-50 (1988).
45. Cf. Earl Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in TIM COR~ornoN IN
MODERN Socm-ry 218, 220 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1966) ("A mature political conception of
the corporation must view it as a rationalized system for the accumulation, control, and
administration of power."). Of course, the law of business associations is broader than corporate
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must obviously play a central role in the development of corporate law.46
The most basic rules of corporate law involve the structure and governance
of businesses that "incorporate," which means simply filing with a state
government "founding documents" (usually a certificate of incorporation
and any required supporting documents). 47 Beyond the ministerial require-
ments of the founding act, corporate law also structures and, at least to a
certain extent, circumscribes the activities of incorporated businesses and
the participants associated with them. Moreover, the powers and restrictions
of corporate law are formulated with a view (at least in theory) toward
achieving a set of rules for incorporated businesses that conduce to the
public advantage. In the words of Professor Melvin Eisenberg, "corporate
law is constitutional law" in this fundamental sense.
4
1
State statutes confer broad general powers on corporations to enter into
contracts, to own real and personal property, to sue and be sued, to appoint
agents, to transact business, and even to make payments and charitable
donations in the "name of the corporation. ' 49 In this regard, a corporation
is properly considered an entity.50 It is true that real businesses and real
people lie behind this legally created entity, and there are real dangers in
"reification" of the corporation." At the same time, it remains accurate to
law, including the law of agency, partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited liability
companies, and the law of enterprise organizations is broader still, including the law of nonprofit
organizations, including nonprofit corporations.
46. The most comprehensive contemporary account of how economic policy should
structure the rules of corporate law is given in EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMc
STRucTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6. To the extent their theory depends on a definition
or theory of "the corporate contract," however, the account offered here implicitly criticizes
their theory of the corporation. See id. at 1-39 (describing version of "the corporate contract");
see also RICHAR A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 391-97 (4th ed. 1992) (describing
the corporation in economic terms as "a standard contract").
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102-105 (1983).
48. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUcTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
1 (1976). During a presentation of an earlier draft, one commentator suggested that I am
asserting a revised "concession" theory of the corporation. But I do not believe that government,
through modern corporation statutes, grants sovereign power to business corporations (although
concession theory may make some sense in an historical account of corporate .law). Instead,
government sets the rules by which business can be done in the corporate form and rules with
respect to corresponding rights and duties of individuals and groups of individuals participating
in corporate enterprises. This is not concession theory. It has more in common with "structural"
theories of corporate law. See, e.g., id. at 1-6.
49. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 12Z (1983); REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02
(1984). These powers are nothing new. They were recognized by "the jurists of the Roman
Empire, the canonical contemporaries of Innocent IV, [and] the 15th century English justices."
CONARD, supra note 37, at 441.
50. CONARD, supra note 37, at 441-43.
51. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 42, at 109-10, 271-72. My favorite statement
on reification is by Felix Cohen:
Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in corporations
if we don't believe in angels? To be sure, some of us have seen corporate funds,
corporate transactions, etc. (just as some of us have seen angelic deeds, angelic
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say that a creditor, for example, may have a right against "a corporation"
in the corporate name, and for purposes of collecting on a debt the creditor
may sue "the corporation" without worrying about whom it represents or
what it is.S2
Corporate law also provides that corporate power must be exercised
according to certain mandatory rules, which "govern defined issues in a
manner that cannot be varied by corporate actors." 3 For example, all
publicly held corporations must have a board of directors.14 Corporate law
requires shareholders to elect the members of the board of directors through
regularly scheduled annual elections5" or special elections for special occa-
sions.5 6 Perpetual directorships are therefore universally banned.57 Fiduciary
duties of directors and management ire also mandatory."8
At the same time, much of corporate law is instead suppletory, providing
default or off-the-rack rules that apply "unless corporate actors adopt other
rules in a specified manner." 59 And even more corporate law is enabling,
giving "legal effect to rules that corporate actors adopt in a specified
manner."6°
Those who advocate a strongly contractarian view of corporate law
emphasize the enabling character of corporate law, the actual extent of
countenances, etc). But this does not give us the right to hypostatize, to "thingify,"
the corporation....
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLum. L. REV.
809, 811 (1935).
52. In this respect, the entity theory of the corporation has been described by Professor
Hamilton as follows:
The nature of the fictitious entity that is a corporation is never precisely defined.
A corporation can be envisioned as an artificial person having most of the same
powers, rights, and duties that an individual has. This artificial person has no flesh,
no blood, no eyes, or mouth but it may nevertheless do many things that real people
do: it may sue and be sued, enter into contracts, purchase property, run a business,
and so forth.
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FuNDAMENTAs OF MODERN Busnmss 482 (1989).
53. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1461.
54. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) (with exception if included in certificate
of incorporation); Rav. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT 4 8.01 (1984) (with exception for corporations
with 50 or fewer shareholders).
55. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1983); REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.01
(1984).
56. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (1983) (by board or according to by-laws);
REy. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.02 (1984) (by board, by 10% of shareholder votes, or
according to by-laws).
57. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note
6, at 3.
58. See Clark, supra note 10, at 64. Professor Gordon provides a list of mandatory rules
in the relatively lax law of Delaware. Gordon, supra note 12, at 1553-54 n.16. His list is
contested, in part, by Professor Romano. Romano, supra note 12, at 1599-1602.
59. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1461; see also Coffee, supra note 10, at 932.
60. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1461; see also Coffee, supra note 13, at 1618 (describing
"structure of American corporate law" as "partly enabling, partly mandatory in character").
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which is debated. 61 To whatever degree corporate law is enabling, however,
participants in the debate often overlook a central feature of enabling rules:
they too provide legal legitimacy to a certain way of organizing economic
power through the corporate form. 62 Enabling rules say, "Yes, it is alright
to set up a central management with decentralized financing structured by
the issuance of shares of stock and through loan agreements. It is alright
to organize economic power in the manner that you wish."
Some commentators who are influenced by the nexus of contracts model
extol the contractual freedom of enabling rules and, by hypothesis, the
increased social wealth that should, according to economic theory, result.
Skeptics, emphasize that enabling rules do not provide the regulatory over-
sight that mandatory rules make possible. The best outcome probably lies
.in some balanced mix of enabling and mandatory rules, depending on the
circumstances and the type of legal rule in question. 63 Situations likely to
result in "market failure" require mandatory rules, while circumstances of
"regulatory failure" call for suppletory or enabling rules to allow the
market to operate through contracting. 4 My purpose, however, is not to
take a position one way or another concerning the debate over mandatory
and enabling rules.6 My thesis that corporate law concerns the structure of
economic power does not depend on the mix of enabling, suppletory, or
mandatory rules that are adopted. A regime of entirely enabling corporate
law would nonetheless confer legal power to structure corporate businesses
in a particular manner.
In this context, it is helpful to introduce another of H.L.A. Hart's
distinctions, namely, the difference between "power-conferring" and "duty-
imposing" rules." This distinction parallels the enabling and mandatory
rules of corporate law. Hart's distinction is more telling, however, because
it makes clear that the enabling rules of corporate law are power-conferring
in the same sense as, for example, the power-conferring rules of contract
61. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 6; Romano,
supra note 12. The best collection of articles on the enabling/mandatory debate is Symposium,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1395 (1989).
62. See infra Part IV for further consideration of legitimacy and corporate law.
63. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLuM. L. Ray. 1395 (1989):
Within the law of corporations, the question of limits to contractual freedom is
one of great theoretical and practical importance. It is a question with which every
scholar of corporate law must wrestle.... [I]t appears that much thinking still needs
to be done-on the part of regulators and deregulators....
Id. at 1415.
64. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1524. Eisenberg contrasts the "Nirvana Fallacy," which
"consists of believing that just because markets are not perfect, mandatory rules would be
better," with the "Heavenly Market Fallacy," which takes the view that "because regulation
is imperfect, any market, no matter how terribly flawed, is heavenly, and therefore to be
preferred to a mandatory legal rule." Id. at 1524-25.
65. See Symposium, supra note 61 (collecting articles discussing debate).
66. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40-41 (1961).
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law. 67 For both enabling corporate law and contract law, a judgment is
made about the social desirability of having a market-based system, and
the law provides rules by which the system operates. Neither enabling
corporate law nor contract law is given ex ante, for example, by the science
of economics. 68 Instead a society over time chooses collectively to adopt a
market-based system, provides a legal underpinning for it, and, through
law, creates conditions necessary for markets to operate and, incidentally,
for market-based economics to have a subject. 69 Recognition of this fact is
important, because a danger in the current theoretical debate concerns the
assumption that "contracts" are somehow natural. They are not. 70 Instead,
markets are, at least to a significant extent, created by power-conferring
rules of a legal system.
Understanding that different policy considerations concerning the desir-
ability of markets in particular contexts yield different kinds of rules-
whether conceived as enabling or mandatory, or power-conferring or duty-
imposing-means that in corporate law an absolutist choice among man-
datory, suppletory, and enabling rules is not required. 7' Different situations
may call for different types of rules. The resulting overall mix of legal rules
may, one hopes, achieve the optimum social policy desired. 72 This result
67. Hart uses contract law as an example of power-conferring rules. Id.
68. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dicholotomy and Invest-
ment Theory: Implications for Securities Markets Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C.
L. RPv. 137, 307 (1991) (describing the "value-neutral" view of economics as a "fallacy"). But
see Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 984,
987-98 (1993) (arguing that scientific evidence supports contractarian claims for corporate system
of entirely enabling rules).
69. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract
and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389 (1993). Professor Frankel correctly describes the
creation of markets as requiring not only contract law, but property law. Id. at 389-91.
Corporate law involves a mix of contract and property law, as well as trust, agency, adminis-
trative, and constitutional law. To reduce corporate law to contractual principles alone is
inconceivable.
On the historical role of law and politics in the formation of markets, see, for example,
KARL PoLANyr, Tan GREAT TRANSFORMAION: THE PoLrncAL AND ECONOIC ORIGINS OF OUR
Tnsm 43-102 (Beacon Press 1957) (1944).
70. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 11, at 699:
[C]ontractarians neglect the implications of the fact that contracts are not self-
enforcing. Contractarians view non-contractual legal approaches as "regulatory;" in
contrast, they see contract as a device by which parties control their relations.and
achieve their desires by consent. Their approach thus misconceives contract because
all law, including contract, is regulatory.
71. As a matter of jurisprudence, "suppletory" rules can be classified as a variant of
"enabling" rules because the option is left to those to whom power has been conferred to
change the suppletory rule, thus in effect changing it from a "mandatory" rule to an "enabling"
one.
72. Professor Eisenberg, for example, believes optimistically that
[C]orporation law taken as a whole ... contains a significant number of core
mandatory rules to govern divergencies of interest between top managers and share-
holders. And to a significant extent, these are just the mandatory rules that corporation
law should contain.
Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1485.
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depends, of course, on what the rules are and how they are applied and
enforced. However, to the extent that a mix of mandatory, suppletory, and
enabling rules is chosen, the level of technical complexity of corporate law
increases. Part of the technical complexity owes to the combination and
interaction of different types of regulatory rules. Mandatory rules are duty-
imposing. Enabling rules are power-conferring. Supplementary rules are also
power-conferring, either by default or by choice . 3 The combination of all
of them, different rules for different circumstances, composes the technical
complexity of corporate law.
In this connection, consider Professor Bernard Black's suggestion that
corporate law is, for the most part, "trivial. 7 4 Black argues that investors
and managers are able, at least with the help of clever lawyers 75  to
"establish[] any set of governance rules they want. ' 76 Therefore, "the
mandatory/enabling balance ... isn't really there." ' 77 Corporate law is in
fact fully enabling because any mandatory rules are "either avoidable or
have no bite."' 78 Even if Black's "triviality hypothesis" proved correct,
corporate law would nonetheless remain important. Even if corporate law
were entirely enabling, it would describe the rules by which economic power
is socially structured, which is not a trivial matter, although corporate law
would then collapse into a specialized category of contract and property
law.
79
In addition, Black and others who downplay the importance of man-
datory rules overlook one large category of cases-a complex subset of
corporate law all its own-which may best illustrate my thesis that the
technical rules of corporate law are primarily about structuring economic
organizational power. Take, for example, the "trivial" but mandatory rule
that sets a deadline for notice of shareholders' meetings.80 Professor Black
73. See supra note 71 (describing suppletory rules as really a variation of enabling rules).
74. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, 84 Nw. U. L. Rav. 542, 544 (1990)
(suggesting "triviality hypothesis" where "appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is
trivial" and "what is left of state corporate law is an empty shell that has form but no
content").
75. Black suggests that instead of black-letter corporate law, "we [law professors] teach
corporate law courses where the central themes include how complex organizations are structured,
and how corporate law and planning by corporate lawyers can facilitate those structures." Id.
at 593.
76. Id. at 544.
77. Id..at 551.
78. Id.
79. Although contractarian theorists emphasize contract law, it is impossible that even an
entirely enabling corporate law would not involve rules of property, given that one of the basic
aspects of a corporate enterprise is the power to divide shares of property ownership, giving
rights to property not only to shareholders but also creditors. See MANNING & HANKS, supra
note 42, at 5-19 (discussing nature of "legal capital"); see also Frankel, supra note 69.
80. Professor Gordon calls this type of rule, of the mandatory species, "procedural" and
gives this example. Gordon, supra note 12, at 1591 & n.129 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 222(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988) (notice of shareholder meeting neither greater than 60 days nor




gives this rule as an example of an "unimportant" rule." Although ordi-
narily mundane, however, the rule for notice of a shareholders' meeting
can become suddenly important when the issue is one of corporate control.
Talk of triviality is banished in these cases, and lawyers search out applicable
mandatory rules of corporate law and use them as weapons . 2 This ostensibly
trivial rule became crucial, for example, in the leading Delaware case of
Aprahamian v. HBO & Co.83 The Chancery Court held an incumbent board,
by changing the date for an annual meeting, to have impermissibly tampered
with the shareholder election machinery.8
Not only does corporate law set the rules for everyday governance, it
also provides rules for successorship and changes in control. Mergers or-
dinarily occur through board action, with or without shareholder approval,
depending on the particular situation and the state law involved. 5 Outside
of the usual course, change in control of a corporation can occur through
proxy fight or tender offer.8 6 Both processes are regulated by state corporate
law and by federal securities laws.Y Given the stakes involved, namely,
economic power, control cases are heavily litigated.88 This case law is
technically complex, both factually and legally.8 9
81. Black, supra note 74, at 560-61 ("Delaware ... requires companies to give written
notice of a shareholder meeting no more than sixty days before the meeting. This seems silly.
What's wrong with ninety days notice? The maximum period may survive because it's easy to
give notice no more than sixty days before the meeting date. Other examples of unimportant
rules are as numerous as our imagination in considering unlikely situations.").
82. Black's model of educating corporate lawyers or planners, see supra note 75, may
neglect educational needs of another sort of lawyer, namely, the litigator. Also, corporate
planners should know the hazards of their plans, which often lie in one or another mandatory
corporate law enforceable in court.
83. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).
84. Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1205-07 (Del. Ch. 1987). Of course, this
violation of an admittedly trivial formal rule was not all there was to the decision. An important
policy concern was that of "corporate democracy." Id. ("In the interests of corporate democ-
racy, those in charge of the election machinery of the corporation must be held to the strictest
possible standards in providing for and conducting corporate elections."). In any event,
abridgement of the procedural rule was sufficient for the Chancery Court to remove the case
from the protection of the business judgment rule and to shift to the directors the burden of
proof regarding manipulation of the election machinery, which was the true substantive, but
still mandatory test. Id. at 1207; see also Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1118-
24 (Del. Ch. 1990) (finding "inequitable manipulation" in board's change of record date for
annual meeting after hostile proxy-tender offer was announced, although recognizing that meeting
dates could be "postponed at least in some circumstances").
85. This area alone is very complex. For an overview of the basic law of mergers,
consolidations, and sales of assets under Delaware law, see WELCH & TuREzYN, supra note 41,
at 553-721. For general discussion of these topics, see CLARK, supra note 15, at 401-530.
86. See Louis Loss, FuNDAMENTAiS OF SactnRuTaS REuLArION 497 (1988).
87. See id. at 449-541 (discussing federal securities rules concerning pioxies and tender
offers); CILRK, supra note 15, at 531-92 (discussing tender offers); EIsENBERG, supra note 48,
at 97-127 (discussing state proxy machinery).
88. For an overview of leading cases under Delaware law, see WELCH & TuREzYN, supra
note 41, at 86-187.
89. See id.
15831993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1565
Usually, the mandatory rules at issue in control cases concern whether
corporate boards have properly complied with their fiduciary duties when
either defending against unwanted takeover attempts or authorizing mergers
or acquisitions that affect the basic governing structure of the corporation. 9f
In these kinds of cases, where case law is thick, the central function of
corporate law in structuring business power is readily apparent.
Considerable research, debate, and discussion continues about the rel-
ative merits of a "free market in corporate control." Neoclassical economists
and similarly minded lawyers tend to argue that loosening some of the
major impediments to hostile takeovers (proxy fights and tender offers)
would promote goals of social wealth maximization and economic effi-
ciency. 9' State antitakeover statutes are a favorite target, because they have
essentially shut down the hostile takeover market prevalent in the 1980s. 9
This argument, however, is not one of corporate theory, but economic
policy. Economics may point the way toward correct social policy and,
hence, desirable corporate legal rules for control situations. But economic
policy cannot supply a complete theory of corporate law. Corporate law is
not primarily about economics; it is about economic power.
Take for example, cases involving corporate control. As anyone who
has been closely connected with a hostile takeover can attest, corporate
control contests are about exactly that-control-in other words, power. In
court, economic policy arguments are marshalled by competing factions to
try to sway judges and to achieve contestants' goals. For litigants in control
cases, economic policy is more a tool than an end.
At the time of this writing, a control contest dominates the press and
illustrates my contention. Paramount Communications had structured a
cozy merger with Viacom, and with hostile takeovers in abeyance since the
late 1980s, 93 the parties relaxed and looked forward to the combination. 94
Viacom's share-priced offer for Paramount was about $7.5 billion.95 But
QVC Network spoiled the party by putting forward a competing hostile bid
valued at about $9.5 billion.96 After Paramount's board refused QVC's
offer, the Delaware Chancery Court struck down the lock-up provision and
90. See id.; see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., Nos.
427,1993, 428,1993, 1993 WL 544314 (Del. Dec. 9, 1993).
91. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAgv. L. REv. 1161, 1165-82 (1981);
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 6, at 1416-18.
92. I review the different forms of state antitakeover statutes in Orts, supra note 23, at
37-39. See also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 1425, 1438-55 (1991).
93. I discuss reasons for the decline and possible return of hostile takeovers in Orts, supra
note 23, at 35-37.
94. Geraldine Fabrikant, Giant Merger Set in Entertainment, N.Y. Timm, Sept. 13, 1993,
at Al.
95. Laura Landro & Johnnie L. Roberts, QVC's $9.5 Billion Bid for Paramount Brings




poison pill adopted in the Viacom-Paramount merger agreement, 9 and the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.98 As this Article goes to press, an auction
is underway, and the outcome is uncertain.9
The point of the example, however, has little to do with the eventual
legal outcome. From the press, one learns what insiders (and their lawyers)
know for certain in any hostile takeover and, for that matter, virtually any
merger or acquisition. Although legal arguments are cast in terms of "best
interests of the shareholders," "reasonable care," "business judgment,"
and whatever other operational legal terms and standards apply, the under-
lying issue is one of economic power and corporate control. In reality, these
battles usually involve huge personal egos, the wealthy and influential
powers-that-be of corporate America. In the case of Paramount-Viacom-
QVC, for example, one could predict with great certainty that Martin Davis,
the CEO of Paramount, would not negotiate a friendly deal with Barry
Diller, the CEO of QVC, because the two had "expressed frosty contempt
toward each other" ever since Diller had resigned from Paramount (formerly
named Gulf & Western).' °
Examples of this kind can be found in virtually any contest for corporate
control, large or small. An earlier contest involving Paramount and the
planned combination of Time Warner, which resulted in the landmark
decision, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,IOI provides another
case study of personal egos vying for power.'02 Allies, especially lawyers
and investment bankers, line up behind their respective leaders. Headline
97. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch.
1993).
98. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 427,1993, 428,1993, 1993
WL 544314 (Del. Dec. 9, 1993).
99. Geraldine Fabrikant, Viacom Seen Questioning a Higher Bid, N.Y. TIms, Jan. 5,
1994, at D1; Laura Landro,-More Than Paramount Is at Stake as New Bids Are Readied in
Buyout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1993, at Al; Johnnie L. Roberts & Randall Smith, Paramount
Opts To Put Itself Up for Auction, WAL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1993, at A3.
100. Landro & Roberts, supra note 95, at AS. As the Wall Street Journal described the
contest,
The battle for Paramount will pit the most powerful moguls in the entertainment
industry against each other in a contest for one of the only remaining independent
entertainment and media companies in the U.S. The main players are among the
most ruthless and strong-willed in the industry, with long and complex ties ....
Id. at Al; see also Floyd Norris, Can't Tell Viacom From QVC?, N.Y. TnmS, Jan. 30, 1994,
§ 4, at 3 (describing the contest as "a drama of revenge and betrayal" involving "some of the
more flamboyant characters in corporate casting"). But see Landro, supra note 99, at A10
(quoting Barry Diller as saying his bidding for Paramount is "totally responsible and not filled
with an ounce of ego").
101. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). How much of a landmark Paramount v. Time will remain
depends on the Delaware Supreme Court's final opinion in Paramount v. QVC. See supra notes
97-98 and accompanying text.
102. For a behind-the-scenes account, see Bill Saporito, The Inside Story of Time. Warner,
FORTUNE, Nov. 20, 1989, excerpted in RONALD J. GiisoN & BEmNA S. BLACK, (SoM oF) TIm
ESSENTIALs OF FINANCE AND INVEsTMENT 42-64 (1993).
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takeovers are commonly described as "battles" and "wars," and use of
the terms is not accidental. 03
The law of mergers and acquisitions illustrates the rule that corporate
law is fundamentally about the structuring of economic power. As one
federal district court judge said in the mid-1980s case of Warner Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Murdoch,104
The conduct of corporate affairs often produces highly charged,
hostile battles for corporate control; battles which often resemble a
corporate form of feudal warfare. Invariably, these battles are taken
out of the marketplace and brought into court, whereby couirts are
asked to serve as arbiters between the warring factions. 05
These conflicts are not about abstract economic theories, but about the
structure of concrete economic relationships, which corporate law regulates
one way or another.
I do not continue in this Part to attempt a recapitulation of corporate
law in all of its technical complexity. I have outlined some of the major
kinds of rules in corporate law, and given some examples. Most readers, I
suspect, will agree with the proposition that "corporate law is complex."'' 06
This is not to say that corporate law is impossibly difficult for mere
mortals to comprehend. As Professor Eisenberg points out, "Complexity
in determining the law is not equivalent to intellectual difficulty in under-
standing the law. Corporation law is no more intellectually difficult or
inaccessible than most other bodies of law ... ."107 Similarly, Chancellor
William T. Allen remarks about his corporate law docket: "It's not sub-
103. See, e.g., Landro & Roberts, supra note 95, at Al.
104. 581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984).
105. Id. at 1485.
106. If authority for the proposition is needed, it is available. Professor Eisenberg, the
Chief Reporter of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, comments on "the unusual
complexity of corporate law." Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of
Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAw. 1271, 1274 (1993). Reasons for this complexity include
not only the "conflicts, tensions, and cross-currents among the law of fifty states," but also
the fact that corporate law is an impure "mixture of common law, statutory law, procedural
rules, and corporate practice." Id. at 1272-73. Anecdotal evidence of the complexity of corporate
law derives from a description of the size of some primary sources that set forth some of its
basic principles. The new Principles of Corporate Governance, for example, runs to over one
thousand pages, and it is meant to provide a relatively concise "analysis" of the law. AMERcAN
LAW INsTIrTUE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANcE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter ALl]. Even so, as Eisenberg notes, "the
Principles do not cover all of corporate law-much less the entire subject of business associa-
tions-but only a limited number of selected and relatively well-defined topics in corporate
law." Eisenberg, supra, at 1272. The topics covered include "the objective and conduct of the
business corporation, the structure of the corporation, the duty of care, the duty of fair dealing,
the role of directors and shareholders in transactions in control and tender offers, and remedies."
Id.
107. Eisenberg, supra note 106, at 1273-74.
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atomic physics. Reasonably intelligent people can decide these cases." 10 The
point is only that the body of corporate law is composed of a complex set
of statutes and judicial decisions, rules and precedents, law and practice,
which regulates a multitude of detailed issues in various circumstances.
Because corporate law is technically complex, it is not easy to restate
in a few words. This understanding lends credence to Hart's injunction to
exercise caution when thinking about ideas, like "the corporation," which
presuppose a complex set of rules of a legal system. Starting with the
question "What is a corporation?" is less helpful than beginning with the
actual rules of the system. This Part has shown some ways in which
corporate law is technically complex. The next Part suggests that the
technical complexity of corporate law results at least in part from a related
complexity in the normative purposes that corporate law is meant to serve.
III. NORMAIVE COmPLEXlTY: MuLTIPLE VALu Es IN CoRPoRATE LAW
Many areas of law involve trading off competing values, 'depending on
particular circumstances, and corporate law is no exception. Tort law, for
example, often involves competing values of compensating accident victims
and conceptions of fault and negligence. Contract law embraces conflicts
between values of economic efficiency and procedural and substantive
fairness. Deterrence and retribution are twin purposes of criminal law.
In this Part, I argue that the technical complexity of corporate law
derives in part from the normative complexity of its purposes, and that
normative complexity itself adds another dimension needed for a full the-
oretical understanding of corporate law. The policies underlying corporate
law cannot be reduced to a unidimensional value, such as the economic
objective of "maximizing shareholders' wealth" or even, more generally,
"economic efficiency."
I focus first on the normative complexity within the economic objective
itself and find more diversity than many commentators would like to
believe.1 9 I then challenge the view that the economic objective expresses
the sole value of importance in corporate law. A unidimensional economic
view of corporate law is an incorrect empirical description of corporate
law. 10 First, it ignores an obvious implicit value of any body of law: the
norm of following the law."' Second, it fails to account for issues that
relate to an "ethical dimension" of corporate law." 2
108. Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen's Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate
Law, 17 DEL. J. Coap. L. 683, 691 (1992) (citing Lindsey Gruson, Tiny Delaware's Corporate
Clout, N.Y. T~ms, June 1, 1986, at F6 (quoting Chancellor Allen)).
109. See infra Part III.A.
110. In this respect, I agree with Lyman Johnson's claim that "corporate law's torrid love
affair with economics threatens to blind scholars to the limitations (and risks) of adhering to a
single all-purpose outlook." Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the
Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 2215, 2217 (1992) (book review).
111. See infra Part III.B.
112. See infra Part III.C.
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A. The Divided Economic Objective
A favorite claim by law-and-economics reformers is that the principles
of corporate law reduce to a single goal: maximize profit and shareholder
wealth. Even if accepted provisionally as the purpose corporate law should
serve, this goal is not self-executing. It is unhelpful ritualistically to invoke
the maxim of maximizing profit and wealth. Instead, one must ask how a
business can accomplish the goal, through what methods, and in what
circumstances. When one asks these questions, and seriously attempts an-
swers, the economic objective of corporate law divides in several different
ways that are not easily unified.
1. Profit Versus Wealth
An initial distinction concerns a difference between two components of
the "economic objective" as defined by the Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance of the American Law Institute (ALI)," According to the ALI, "a
corporation should ... conduct its business activities with a view to
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain." "1 4 A common assumption
is that profit and wealth are synonymous. As Professor Henry Hu shows,
however, modern financial theory undermines the presumed identity between
"corporate profit" and "shareholder gain."''i
First, Hu argues that if managers of public corporations are truly to
manage for shareholders, they should drop the fiction of managing for "the
corporation.""' 6 Given the now widespread practice of diversified portfolio
investment, shareholders may well wish to take greater risks than a more
conservative management whose goals may include the continued existence
of "the corporation," that is, the corporate business as a going concern,
and, often implicitly, the continued tenure of management. In Hu's words,
[A] diversified shareholder would not want the managers of a
publicly held corporation to act in a way intended to ensure the
well-being of the corporation. If managers were to focus on the
total risk of an investment project instead of the nondiversifiable
risk, for instance, they might enhance the health of the firm, but
they would probably not maximize the share price. Shareholders,
113. ALI, supra note 106, § 2.01(a) cmt. f, at 72. To its credit, the ALI's Principles
implicitly avoids the pitfalls of definitions or theories of "the corporation" by defining
corporation tautologically as "a corporation incorporated under a business corporation law or
an analogue thereof." Id., § 1.12(a), at 17. Analogues of corporation laws include specific
(banking corporations), as well as general, corporation codes. Id., § 1.12 cmt., at 17.
114. Id., § 2.01(a), at 69. Qualifications given to this economic objective are discussed
infra Part III.B and III.C.
115. Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REv. 277, 294 (1990).
116. The analysis in this section applies only to public corporations in which the interests
of shareholders and managers may separate. It does not apply to close corporations in which
the managers are also the only or the predominant shareholders.
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regardless of their individual risk preferences, generally would want
managers instead to focus primarily on nondiversifiable risk in
evaluating corporate investment opportunities.'
1 7
Whether it is realistic to expect managers to take these kinds of risks is
another question, as is whether this kind of increased risk-taking is desirable
from a broader social perspective." 8 At the ground-floor level of defining
the economic objective, however, Hu's point is well taken.
Second, Hu emphasizes that corporate law leaves the time frame of
corporate investment decisions to the discretion of management. The re-
sulting "operational ambiguity"" 9 relates to the problem of long-term versus
short-term horizons discussed below. ,20 The point also applies to the problem
of profit versus wealth. Choice of short or long time horizons adds consid-
erable complexity to a workable conception of the economic objective.' 2'
Third, Hu argues that modem financial theory outstrips traditional
methods of accounting for "corporate earnings."'' 2 If management sets
goals in terms of profits reported through traditional methods of corporate
accounting, overly risk-averse strategies of corporate management and in-
vestment result. More risky and uncertain strategic decisions to invest, for
example, in research and development or potentially revolutionary products
(with greater corresponding risks of failure as well as success) reduce the
bottom line in accounting reports of corporate earnings.'2
In fact, many corporate managers appear already to have learned some
of the lessons of financial theory emphasized by Hu. 24 In a recent study,
Professor Michael Useem finds that managers of seven major companies
that recently experienced intensified shareholder pressure have adopted
117. Hu, supra note 115, at 299-300.
118. Even though some degree of economic productivity may be lost as a result, there may
be social benefit to relatively stable business institutions that provide relatively stable levels of
production and services to customers and relatively stable levels of employment to workers
within the company. Creditors also often prefer companies to make less risky investment
decisions.
119. Hu, supra note 115, at 301-02.
120. See infra Part III.A.2.
121. For a schematic diagram and further discussion of how time horizons complicate the
task of corporate management, see Orts, supra note 23, at 72-73 n.381.
122. Hu, supra note 115, at 302-06.
123. As Hu explains,
A dollar invested in .. strategic pricing or in research and development ...
depresses reported earnings far more than a dollar invested in capital expenditures.
A fixation on reported earnings could thus lead to investment decisions being dictated
not by the cash flow and other real economic attributes of investment opportunities,
but also by the happenstance of accounting conventions.
Id. at 305.
124. Hu argues for a policy of managing for "blissful" shareholder wealth maximization,
which ignores possibly irrational and uninformed fluctuation in stock price and tries instead to
assess what the stock price of a publicly traded company should be, all things considered. Id.
at 357-61.
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sophisticated methods of estimating shareholder value.", He adds that the
managers "understood that [shareholder value] was distinct from traditional
accounting measures of corporate achievement such as revenue growth or
return on equity.'
26
The difference between managing for corporate profit or shareholder
wealth remains important. The economic objective is neither easily defined
nor uncontroversially given. It is radically ambiguous. It reproduces the
divergence of interests between shareholders and managers (and other groups)
that crops up elsewhere in corporate law. Different interests within a
corporate enterprise have different agenda for "profit" and for "wealth."'
27
Indeed, the ambiguity between shareholders' and managers' interests is
only the beginning. One can extend Professor Hu's analysis to include other
competing corporate interests. Not only managers and shareholders, but
creditors, employees, and others aim to profit and acquire wealth from an
ongoing corporate business. The law of corporate governance involves a
more complex game than allowed for by simplistic economic assumptions
of wealth maximization. 2s Additional complexities include business judg-
ments that managers make concerning other corporate claimants. For ex-
ample, rank-and-file employees wish to get salary raises and assurances of
job security, and creditors wish to secure contractual prohibition of certain
actions for credit security, thus potentially decreasing both profit and wealth
available for shareholders and managers. 29 Such everyday complexities of
125. MICHAEL USEEM, ExECuTIvE DEFENSE: SHAREHOLDER POWER AND CORPORATE REOR-
GANIZATION 4-5, 10-11 (1993). Managers of the companies studied "generally chose to define
shareholder value as a combination of stock dividends and share appreciation, accumulated
over a period of years." Id. at 11.
126. Id. (explanation added). Useem documents managerial change in response to share-
holder pressure in the following areas: (1) "flattening" of corporate hierarchies, moving
responsibility for success and failure down the corporate ladder; (2) more information focused
on shareholder value and more widely distributed among managers; (3) managerial decision-
making "more explicitly judged on the basis of the anticipated value to shareholders;" (4)
reduction or "downsizing" of professional and managerial staffs; and (5) tying of executive
performance to shareholder value through variable compensation schemes. Id. at 57-88, 101-11.
127. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1263, 1263 (1992) ("The internal law of corporations is built upon the problem of
competition ... among the various groups of individuals that animate the corporation.").
128. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Cbrporate
Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1988).
129. The ALl recognizes the need for management to respond to the needs of other interests
involved in the business:
The modern corporation by its nature creates interdependencies with a variety of
groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as employees,
customers, suppliers, and members of the communities in which the corporation
operates. The long-term profitability of the corporation generally depends on meeting
the fair expectations of such groups. Short-term profits may properly be subordinated
to recognition that responsible maintenance of these interdependencies is likely to
contribute to long-term profitability and shareholder gain. The corporation's business
may be conducted accordingly.
ALI, supra note 106, at § 2.01 cmt. f, at 72-73.
1590
COMPLEXITY AND LEGITIMACY
business management only increase the ambiguity of the economic objective.
2. Long-Term Versus Short-Term Horizons
The difference between corporate profit and shareholder wealth also
implicates the more familiar problem of time horizons in setting goals for
a corporate business.'30 Although some economists respond that- efficient
capital markets overcome this problem, it is not clear these markets are as
efficient as proponents claim, or, even if capital markets accurately reflect
available information, they may not accurately reflect the value of long-
term planning.
In addition, the economic interests of different shareholders may con-
flict. Shareholders have different time and risk preferences that managers
must somehow factor together, if they are to represent fairly the artificially
unified interest of "the shareholders" in general.' In this sense, one can
speak of a shareholder reification problem analogous to the well-known
tendency to reify the corporation.1 2 As Professor Hu colorfully describes
the problem, "Managers would like to be able to make investment decisions
that benefit both shareholders who are widows or orphans in need of sure
and immediate succor and those who are cowboy capitalists willing to wait
for the big score."'3
One response to the problem of blending long-term and short-term
shareholder value is to say simply that the securities markets already take
this issue into account. 3 4 However, the notion that the markets accurately
reflect long-term fundamental values of companies has come under sustained
fire. Without going into great detail, scholars have raised serious questions
130. For a leading discussion of long-term versus short-term issues in corporate law, see
Hazen, supra note 68. See also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the
Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1313 (1992).
131. As Professor Useem describes this difficulty,
In the logic of ownership-disciplined alignment, shareholder value becomes the central
yardstick of organizational life. It is both a driver and measure of decisions and
designs, and its specific definition thus has fundamental bearing on the thrust of
organizational change. In its simplest form, a company's shareholder value can be
defined as the worth of the firm as judged by the stockholders. In its complex reality,
shareholder value became a blend of diverse stockholder preferences and managerial
constructions of them.
USEEM, supra note 125, at 10.
132. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing reification of corporation).
133. Hu, supra note 115, at 287.
134. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 68, at 143-62, 178-80 (critically discussing efficient market
theory and portfolio investment theory in context of short-term and long-term management
practices and concluding that "it seems abundantly clear that most corporate managers are
focusing too much on short-term considerations" despite supposedly efficient markets). But cf.
UsEEM, supra note 125, at 37 ("Contrary to some conventional wisdom, institutional investors
tend to take long-term positions in many of their companies. But this should not be surprising,
since their holdings are so large that high turnover would be costly if not impractical.").
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about how efficient the capital markets are, and in what ways. 35 These
questions give reason for caution before elevating principles of efficient
market theory to the status of entrenched legal policy. 13 6
More importantly, even the "strong" version of the so-called Efficient
Market Hypothesis, which claims that "prices instantaneously and accurately
reflect not only all publicly available data but all relevant information that
can be known,' ' 3 7 does not require that the information reflected is relevant
to long-term performance. On the contrary, capital markets may systemat-
ically undervalue plans or strategies beyond a time horizon of, say, a
generation or two. 
138
Even if the capital markets processed available information as efficiently
and accurately as possible, the distinction between managing for the long-
term versus the short-term remains. Short-term and long-term strategies
often differ. Drastic cost-cutting, for example, may easily achieve short-
term results, improving the bottom line for a few quarters. But in the long-
term, severe cost-cutting may seriously harm a business. 13 9
Long-term strategic thinking also involves problems of uncertainty in
analysis and decisionmaking. Professor Aron Katsenelinboigen captures the
problem of making decisions in the face of uncertainty in his theory of
"indeterministic economics."140 Businesses face considerable economic
135. For a brief overview, see MARSHALL E. BLUm ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET:
THm RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NEW YORK STOCK ExcRANGE 85-102 (1993). See also Hu, supra
note 115, at 339-42.
136. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 764-65 (1985); William K.S.
Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U. CAL. DAVIs L. REv.
341 (1986). But see Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 545 (1984).
137. Hazen, supra note 68, at 155 (citing SIMON M. KEANE, STOCK MARKEr EFFICENCY-
THEORY, EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 10 (1983)).
138. The human life-span as an outside limit to the time horizons of investments in capital
markets may not yet have received sufficient attention. Some very wealthy investors may have
an intergenerational outlook, but my guess is that they are by no means the rule. Most investors
are looking to make money in their own lifetimes.
139. A former CEO of two companies informed me at a conference recently that he knew
of two other CEOs. who had adopted radical "downsizing" strategies on the advice of
management consultants with little or no consideration of long-term strategy.
140. ARON KATSENELiNBOIGEN, INDETE=RmNiTC ECONOMICS (1992). Following a systems
theory approach, Katsenelinboigen describes the "indeterminism" of systems as follows:
From the functional perspective, the degree of indeterminism of a system may
be defined as the degree of influence it can exert upon development as manifest in
the varying degree of uncertainty. In other words, the degree of indeterminism
incorporates two factors: the impact of the action and its uncertainty. The stronger
the impact upon development, the more the system is determined, and, consequently,
the lesser is the degree of indeterminism. From the structural point of view, the
degree of indeterminism is defined as the degree of completeness and consistency of
the links of the system. In terms of process, the degree of indeterminism can be
viewed as the extent of amenability of the processes taking place in the system to
change. From the standpoint of an operator, the degree of indeterminism reflects the
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uncertainty and indeterminacy.' 4'
Katsenelinboigen illustrates the problem with an example from the game
of chess. In chess, the number of possible moves in any situation is finite.
Therefore, it is theoretically possible for a computer to generate all the
possible moves in each situation and recommend a solution. However,
because the number of possible moves is so great (10120), even supercom-
puters must make choices in an environment characterized by significant
indeterminacy.
42
One traditional method of constraining indeterminism in chess is to
follow standard openings. Manageable principles for playing end-games also
emerge when the number of pieces are few and the objective (the opponent's
King) stands plainly in view. 43 Most interesting and complex, however, is
the middle-game. After a standard opening has been followed, lots of pieces
remain on the board, and objectives for long-term success are difficult to
find and to follow. Here, various styles of play emerge that are "associated
with strategic vision of the game.'" 4 One example is the "positional style,"
which focuses on "limited goals," such as developing one's pieces into
powerful positions on the board or mounting a positional attack on an
opponent's flank. 45 A second example is the "combinational style," which
focuses on achieving a specific intermediate objective, such as seizing the
opponent's Queen. "A characteristic feature of combinational style," Kat-
senelinboigen says, "is the formulation of a narrow objective together with
a completely specified program of its achievement."'4
Strategic thinking in chess is relevant by analogy to corporate decision-
making. Katsenelinboigen argues that the "classical approach" to business
behavior follows a variation of the combinational style, aiming for the
traditional profit objective. These methods are "connective" or "combi-
national-connective" in that they aim to set objectives for profits over a
particular period, and then, to the extent possible, they "connect" various
operational steps with the objective.' 47 These methods are, according to
Katsenelinboigen, "the easiest to teach," because they rely on straightfor-
power of the operator that executes the various processes.
Id. at 38.
141. Id. at 56-59, 280-90.
142. Id. at 47. Even supercomputers cannot simply run every possibility in a chess program.
As Katsenelinboigen notes, given the huge number of possible moves in a chess game, "the
execution of [the] algorithm, even by the fastest operators in the guise of computers operating
at the speed of light, might take hundreds of thousands of years." Id. He later notes that the
best computer program, taking many "intelligent" short-cuts, is "formidable" and performs at
"a level of a weak grandmaster." Id. at 70 (citing Feng-hsiung Hsu et al., A Grandmaster
Chess Machine, Sci. AM., Oct. 1990, at 44).
143. Id. at 69.
144. Id. at 71.
145. Id. at 70-71.
146. Id. at 72.
147. Id. at 75-76.
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ward applications of a "programming (scientific) method.' 1 4 But Katse-
nelinboigen states:
Much more intractable is the positional style and the goal-selection
aspect of the combinational method. They are less routine and
depend to a large extent on the subjective abilities of the leader [of
a business]. Instruction in this area must aim at enriching the
leaders' intuition, helping them with conceptual recognition of what
they are doing. In other words, learning the positional style could
help leaders formulate and solve problems by enabling them to
express explicitly the many intuitive considerations that were pre-
viously taken into account implicitly in the course of decision
making.
49
Here lies the difficult problem of selecting gifted leaders to run large
enterprises wisely and in accordance with the best long-term strategy.
A more concrete example may help to bring home the point with respect
to the uncertain and indeterminate nature of pursuing the economic objective
in the long-term. Instead of following standard approaches to increasing
profits, a better long-term strategy following a positional style might focus
on an intermediate goal, such as increasing market share. 50 The Japanese
automobile manufacturing and marketing success over American companies
may provide a good example of this kind of long-term strategic thinking.,,,
Complex strategic issues involved in modern business management do
not easily reduce to standardized legal formula, even if based on economic
criteria. Corporate law must take account of the difficulty of trading off
short-term and long-term planning horizons and the corresponding com-
plexity of corporate decisionmaking that affects shareholders, creditors,
employees, and other interested groups. 52
3. Central Management
Partly in response to difficult issues of finding the best strategy for a
corporate business, corporate law provides a standard form for a profes-
148. Id. at 77.
149. Id. (explanation added). Katsenelinboigen recognizes teaching limits for advanced
strategic styles of leadership. Referring again to the chess analogy, he writes,
[I]t is quite apparent that the achieved level of play is directly correlated to individual
abilities. There is a limit to the level of play that can be achieved by teaching a
person of average aptitude; beyond this level, teaching is practically ineffectual. It is
well known that a positional sacrifice (not the routine kind) is not recommended for
players below master's strength. But becoming a master takes more than just learning.
Similar considerations apply in teaching the positional style (not to mention charismatic
style) to business leaders.
Id. at 77-78.
150. See id. at 249-62 (discussing quantitative methods of analyzing firm performance).
151. See, e.g., Edward N. Luttwak, With a Rare Opportunity, Ford Blew It, N.Y. TBIES,
Oct. 24, 1993, § 3, at 11.
152. See supra notes 120-21, 128-29 and accompanying text.
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sional central management. 15 3 In practice, a great number of different factors
complicate the economic objective. Central management is one response to
the increasing practical complexity of business decisionmaking.
15 4
For the most part, central management has been successful in purely
economic terms.1 55 Alfred Chandler has demonstrated how the corporate
organizational transformation developed efficiencies of scale and scope that
helped to spark a phenomenal period of economic growth in the twentieth
century. 56 Hierarchical business organizations can also save on transaction
costs when it is cheaper to provide goods or services internally rather than
through market purchases or sales. 5 7 Central management provides yet
another kind of efficiency in enabling managerial divisions of labor, through
specialized educational training of future managers and differentiation of
managerial occupations within businesses.' s
Corporate law contributes to these types of economic efficiencies by
providing a framework, and legal and political legitimacy, allowing hierar-
chical business organizations of a specific type to develop. It enables and
encourages the creation of centralized management through widespread
contributions of capital to business enterprises. Corporate law provides rules
to constrain central management to act on behalf of the interests of capital
contributors. Doctrines like the duty of loyalty express constraints on the
153. See JAMES WILLARD HUtnsT, THE LEorrmTAcY OF THE BusiNEss CORPORATION IN THE
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 158 ("For both small and large enterprises the
corporation provided a defined, legally protected, and practically firm position of authority for
those in central control.").
154. For an introduction to some works in organizationl theory dealing with institutional
responses to the problem of complexity in decisionmaking, see Herbert A. Simon, Rational
Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 Am. EcoN. REv. 493 (1979). See also supra note
4.
155. By "success" here I mean the increase of social wealth in general. However, the rise
of the corporate form may also have helped to increase the gap between rich and poor citizens.
156. CHANDLER, supra note 15. Chandler describes economies of scale as "those that result
when the increased size of a single operating unit producing or distributing a single product
reduces the unit cost of production or distribution." Id. at 17. Economies of scope are
"economies of joint production or distribution" that result "from the use of processes within
a single operating unit to produce or distribute more than one product." Id.; see also ALFRED
D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VIsIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BusmNEss
(1977).
157. As Chandler describes this economic efficiency of centralized management,
Transaction costs are those involved in the transfer of goods and services from one
operating unit to another. When these transactions are carried out between firms or
between individuals, they usually involve the transfer of property rights and are
defined in contractual terms. When they are carried out within the enterprise, they
are defined by accounting procedures. The costs of such transactions are reduced by
a more efficient exchange of goods and services between units, whereas the economies
of scale and scope are closely tied to the more efficient use of facilities and skills
within such units.
CHANDLER, supra note 15, at 17. The foremost contemporary advocate of transaction costs
economics is Oliver Williamson. See, e.g,, OLIVER E. WILLIAmSON, THE ECONOWC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPrrALIsM: FntRsS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).
158. See CHANDLER, supra note 156, at 8-9, 464-68.
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power of central managers to take advantage of their positions to serve
themselves, rather than the business they are hired to run.
If the creation of a legal form supportive of central management
structures provides real economic gains to society, then the hierarchical
business structures enabled by corporate law constitute another aspect of
the economic objective. This structural aspect of corporate law is independ-
ent of the narrower strategic aspects of the economic objective concerning
choices of profit or wealth goals and short-term or long-term planning.
4. Capital Accumulation
Another structural aspect of the economic objective of corporate law,
corollary to that of central management, concerns the needs and worries of
those who wish to contribute capital to large and small enterprises. The
corporate form greatly enhances social powers of capital accumulation
through the reduction of risk to individual investors and the resulting
extension of time for applying accumulated capital in long-term projects. 5 9
Although this principle is either too easily forgotten or taken for granted
in contemporary debates, the goal of enabling broad-based capital accu-
mulation for enterprise has historically been an important function of
corporate law. 60 For small firms, corporate law has provided a "standard
form" or, in contemporary terminology, "suppletory rules" for the easy
assembly of groups of relatively passive investors and active managers.' 6'
And the legal principle of limited liability has given investors assurance of
a definite and certain investment risk. 162
The social policy of granting limited liability to corporations, within
certain limits, is an economic one. 63 The traditional justification is to allow
capital formation, without immediate risk to shareholders. But courts and
159. As Professor Abram Chayes summarizes this aspect of the economic objective,
The corporation is necessary because the objects pursued are beyond the reach of the
members as individuals. The needed amounts of capital are too great, the risk is too
high, the duration of the enterprise too long. The corporation is the legal institution
which can hold the aggregated capital of many over a period of time unaffected by
the death or withdrawal of individuals.
Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 25, 34 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1966).
160. HURsT, supra note 153, at 158 (a "prime business utility provided by corporation law
was help in mustering capital").
161. Id. at 158-59. Limited liability is of lesser use to small firms than large ones, given
the practice of creditors insisting on personal guarantees and given the limitations of adequate
capitalization and other "veil piercing" considerations.
162. Id. at 159. Hurst urges, however, that "we must not exaggerate the role of corporation
law in mobilizing capital for the large enterprise." The growth of the investment banking and
the stock exchanges were probably of greater moment. Id.
163. The limits of limited liability are expressed primarily by the "piercing the corporate




legislation extend limited liability to cover even single-shareholder corpora-
tions. 164 In these cases, the rationale must be that limited liability encourages
business activity in general, as long as certain steps are taken, such as
assuring adequate capitalization.1
65
Recently, limited liability has been challenged as a matter of social
policy. 166 How the debate will develop depends on how the economic effects
of limited liability are judged, as well as perceived fairness values that may
be involved. 6' The point here is only that capital accumulation, commonly
thought to be aided by the rule of limited liability, adds another type of
economic value to the normative complexity of the economic objective.
5. Protection of Investors
Related to the rule of limited liability are other corporate law doctrines
designed to protect shareholders. An example is the duty of loyalty, now
renamed, in certain circumstances, the "duty of fair dealing." ' 6 A corporate.
officer or director wishing to enter into an interested transaction with the
corporation must disclose the contemplated transaction beforehand and have
it authorized, disclose the transaction afterward and have it appropriately
ratified, or prove the transaction is intrinsically fair.
69
Other examples of law meant to protect investors come from outside
corporate law. The securities laws are designed with a purpose to protect
investors by requiring disclosure. 7 0 Bankruptcy law aims to protect creditors,
as well as allowing for debtors to reorganize or start again with a clean
slate. 17 And remedies of contract and tort law remain available to investors.
Protection of investors provides yet another variant of the economic
objective. Some may view this aspect of corporate law as unduly paternal-
istic. The ideological predisposition of those who favor contracts as an
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (1983).
165. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 163, at 1-44 to 1-53.
166. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REv.- 1565 (1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
167. As Professor Leebron notes, however, "[d]espite the recent burst of scholarship, few
topics are liable to strike the reader as less likely to produce changes in the law than an analysis
of limited liability." Leebron, supra note 166, at 1566.
168. ALI, supra note 106, at 264. Reference to "duty of fair dealing" rather than "duty
of loyalty" is meant to distinguish cases involving conflicts of interest other than those in which
a corporate director or officer has "a pecuniary interest" in the transaction. Id.
169. This is a very cursory restatement. See id., § 5.02, at 277-78. For discussion of the
considerable variation among state statutes in this area, see id., Reporter's Note, at 312-25.
170. Although other themes are present in the securities laws, "there is the recurrent theme
throughout these statutes of disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure." Loss, supra
note 86, at 7.
171. See, e.g., JAias J. Warm & RA oND T. Nam&ER, BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATE-
RlAiS 52-53 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the three major goals of bankruptcy law as providing (1)
a "fresh start" to individual debtors, (2) "a set of equitable rules for the division of the
debtor's property among various creditors," and (3) "a mechanism for the rehabilitation of a
business debtor who has the capacity to stay in business and to pay most or all of its debt").
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answer to every problem, however, may overlook problems created by
consolidated economic power and central managerial control. The power to
cheat or mislead or "shirk" (in the favorite idiom of law-and-economists)
coincides with the greater efficiency corporate law allows in the organization
of centralized management and decentralized financing. Protectionist cor-
porate law is one traditional form of response.
7 2
6. Protection of Other Interests?
Corporate law may also include protectionist principles that favor other
groups, in addition to shareholders, who have interests in the corporate
business. In at least one area, corporate law has taken a small step in this
direction. Corporate constituency statutes specifically authorize directors
and managers to take account of interests beyond those of shareholders,
including the interests of creditors, employees, and local communities, and
perhaps even social interests such as the quality of natural environment. 73
These statutes take only a small step, because except in extraordinary
situations, such as corporate control contests or governance of nearly
insolvent corporations, the statutes only reaffirm traditional prerogatives of
managerial discretion in running the corporate enterprise. 74
172. For a critical discussion of the concept of legal paternalism, see TREBILCOCK, supra
note 40, at 147-63. Paternalistic principles of corporate law often focus on traditional criteria
concerned with "the pre-conditions for the exercise of autonomous choices," including freedom
from "compulsion" and "ignorance of the circumstances." Id. at 148 & tbl. 1 (citing JOE.L
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 113 (1986)).
173. Pennsylvania's constituency statute, for example, provides:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, com-
mittees of the board and individual directors of a business corporation may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they deem
appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action, including
shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and
upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are
located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including benefits that
may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
(3) The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of any person
seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
(4) All other pertinent factors.
15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a) (Supp. 1993).
The statutes do not include the natural environment among the listed interests and issues
that corporate directors and managers may consider. However, broad, catch-all clauses of "other
pertinent factors" and "short-term and long-term interests" are often included. E.g., id.; see
also Orts, supra note 23, at 29 & nn.64-65. One could interpret these clauses to authorize
consideration of broader social policy issues relevant to the corporate business.
In addition to the quality of the natural environment, another candidate for the current
agenda of corporate social responsibility is the quality of educational systems, which produce
the primary resource of managers and employees.
174. See Orts, supra note 23, at 41-44, 92-122; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971, 1002 (1992) ("[Olne might argue
that the statutes do no more than to bring the law's rhetoric into line with its reality.").
1599
COMPLEXITY AND LEGITIMACY
Some commentators argue that courts should expansively interpret con-
stituency statutes to accord legally enforceable rights to nonshareholder
interests. 75 These arguments, however, call for a brand of judicial activism
that would ignore the plain meaning of the statutes, which intend clearly
to provide managerial discretion, rather than to multiply mandatory man-
agerial duties. 76 More traditional commentators argue that courts should
instead ignore the clear import of constituency statutes, on the ground that
broadening the range of managerial discretion would be too confusing. 77
From a jurisprudential point of view, this approach is disturbingly anti-
democratic. In contrast to both extreme positions, I have read constituency
statutes to support the traditional legal protection given to corporate man-
agement in considering a complex array of factors in decisionmaking,
including the interests of the various groups specified in the statutes. 78
Although some may criticize the statutes as not going far enough to protect
these other interests, it remains important that the statutes explicitly allow
directors and managers to consider them. Constituency statutes in this way
expand the allowable parameters of the economic objective.
Through constituency statutes, as well as through traditipnal common-
law doctrines of the business judgment rule and the duty of care, corporate
law permits decisionmaking that includes in the economic objective other
interests beyond those of shareholders. Expanding the economic objective
in this way is left to managerial discretion. At present, the economic
objective does not extend to granting enforceable rights to these nontradi-
tional interests. Perhaps it should, but that is an issue for policymakers to
make in the appropriate places: Congress, state legislatures, and courts.
Even without admitting other groups beyond shareholders to the gov-
erning table, the economic objective of corporate law is divided within
itself. It is therefore much more complex than some might wish.
175. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 9, at 255-70; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tax. L. REv. 579, 630-
40 (1992); O'Connor, supra note 9, at 1232-34.
176. I make this argument in greater detail in Orts, supra note 23, at 79-84. Possible
exceptions are Connecticut's and Idaho's statutes, which are written in mandatory language.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1993) (directors in making corporate control
decisions "shall consider" long-term as well as short-term interests, the interests of "the
corporation's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers," and "comniunity and societal
considerations"); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602, -1702 (Supp. 1993) (directors "shall consider" long-
term as well as short-term interests and, presumably in control situations, "the possibility that
these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation").
177. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Other Constit-
uencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253, 2253, 2268-69 (1990); Charles
Hansen, Other Constituencies Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1375
(1991). I criticize this interpretation in Orts, supra note 23, at 72-79.
178. Orts, supra note 23, at 84-122. In my view, constituency statutes apply with different
force in different circumstances, for example, decisionmaking in a normal situation as compared
to a crisis situation such as a control contest or near-insolvency. Id.
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B. Following the Law
In addition to the purpose of providing a sufficiently flexible regulatory
framework for economic organization in pursuit of a broadly complex
economic objective, corporate law, as itself a bona fide type of law,
embodies the self-referential value of following the law. Some law-and-
economists forget this truism when they argue that only economic policy
should inform corporate law. They claim that if society desires business to
cherish other values, then other types of laws besides corporate law should
impose those values. For example, labor and employment law, not corporate
law, should cover concerns of employees. Environmental law, not corporate
law, should protect the natural environment. Corporate law, they maintain,
should remain pure of social values extrinsic to the economic objective. 7 9
This view overlooks the fact that corporate law, even to the extent it
is enabling, expresses policy preferences about the legal structure of business.
Law, even when serving economic purposes, remains an expression of social
power. As such, it deserves to be followed as the law, as long as it meets
requirements of political and legal legitimacy. 80
It is circular to argue that corporate law should adhere to economic
policy prescriptions, and then to argue that the law should be followed
because it correctly prescribes economic policy. In other words, law-and-
economists Sometimes purport to stand outside the law and outside econom-
ics, or inside both at the same time. The truth is that one perspective or
the other must be adopted when discussing any particular subject in cor-
porate law. From the standpoint of economics, one can attempt to explain
why the law is the way that it is, or one can argue in favor of a particular
law or general direction for law reform, on economic grounds. From the
standpoint of law, however, one must first understand what the particular
legal rule or principle is, inquire how to interpret it, and finally consider
how the rule or principle applies in concrete, real-world circumstances.'
179. Dean Robert Clark describes this view as "dualism." Dualists believe in a strict
separation between the "private" realm, including corporate law, and the "public" realm of
social regulation. They maintain that shareholder wealth maximization is the unitary goal of
corporate law. See CLARK, supra note 15, at 677-81. For a view questioning the usefulness of
the public/private distinction in corporate law, see Stone, supra note 23.
180. Of course, the legitimacy of a legal system and its positive law does not necessarily
mean that a particular law should be obeyed in a particular circumstance. There are moral
reasons for deciding not to follow the law (e.g., civil disobedience, breaking a law to save a
person from serious harm). The legitimacy of law and legal systems is discussed below in
connection with corporate law. See infra Part IV.
181. Roscoe Pound describes these distinctions as follows:
Three steps are involved in the adjudication of a controversy according to law: (I)
Finding the law, ascertaining which of the many rules in the legal system is to be
applied, or, if none is applicable, reaching a rule for the cause (which may or may
not stand as a rule for subsequent cases) on the basis of given materials in some way
which the legal system points out; (2) interpreting the rule so chosen or ascertained,
that is, determining its meaning as it was framed and with respect to its intended
scope; (3) applying to the cause in hand the rule so found and interpreted.
RoscoE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 48 (rev. ed. 1954).
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With this basic legal understanding, it then becomes possible to adopt a
critical perspective on the actual law'82 and look to see what economics and
other normative disciplines (including ethics, political science, sociology,
and psychology) say about how the law should operate as a matter of
justifying the existing law or recommending law reform. Given the necessary
division between the essentially legal exercise of ascertaining the law and
the critical exercise of analyzing the law's policy implications, unity of law
and economics is impossible.
A good example is by way of counter-example. When clothed in
academic garb, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook staunchly advocates a free
market in corporate control.' Nevertheless, in Amanda Acquisition Corp.
v. Universal Foods Corp.,'4 he upheld an antitakeover business combination
statute as a valid and constitutional exercise of state power. "If our views
of the wisdom of state law mattered," said Judge Easterbrook, "Wisconsin's
takeover statute would not survive."'"" But he then upheld the law, writing:
Skepticism about the wisdom of a state's law does not lead to the
conclusion that the law is beyond the state's power, however. We
have not been elected custodians of investors' wealth. States need
not treat investors' welfare as their summum bonum. Perhaps they
choose to protect managers' welfare instead, or believe that the
current economic literature reaches an incorrect conclusion and that
despite appearances takeovers injure investors in the long run. Unless
a federal statute or the Constitution bars the way, Wisconsin's
choice must be respected.
18 6
Tongue-in-cheek language notwithstanding, Amanda Acquisition testifies to
the authority of positive law and provides a good example of a judge who
refuses to bend principles of legitimate statutory interpretation to his view
of correct social and economic policy. 1 7
The normative principle of following the law also refers to more than
the positive prescrilitions of corporate law. It concerns whether corporate
actors follow more general laws and the question of when it is permissible
to break the law. Consider, in this connection, two of Dean Robert Clark's
ideal types of "views about the corporation's proper role."'88
182. Elsewhere, I describe this second-order level of analysis as taking the perspective of
"critical legality." Eric W. Orts, Positive Law and Systemic Legitimacy: A Comment on Hart
and Habermas, 6 RATio Jutrs 245, 252 (1993).
183. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, The EcoNomc STRUcTuR OF CoRPoRATE LAW,
supra note 6, at 109-24; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91.
184. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
185. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 500 (1989).
186. Id. at 502.
187. For further discussion of Judge Easterbrook's decision in Amanda Acquisition, see
Dennis Honabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control,
65 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 681, 736-42 (1989).
188. CLARx, supra note 15, at 677.
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The first is the "shareholder wealth maximization" model discussed
above. i 9 On this view, some argue that corporate actors should perform a
cost-benefit analysis with respect to whether particular laws should be
followed.' 90 In some cases, the law may contemplate that parties make
exactly this kind of calculation. Contract law is a good example, where a
party may choose to break a contract and pay for damages, usually without
moral opprobrium. 9' In other cases, a choice about whether to follow the
law is not usually considered available. Environmental law provides an
example. Even if most environmental laws are not criminal, many people
believe that corporate actors have a moral duty to follow them.
92
Somewhat surprisingly, Dean Clark describes a second ideal type ad-
vocating "voluntary compliance with the law" as "modest idealism."' 193 In
Clark's words, this view holds that "corporate managers should cause their
corporations to comply with applicable laws and regulations even when
noncompliance would increase the corporation's net present value."' 94 He
gives an example of regulation of water pollution.19s Is it acceptable for
189. See supra Part III.A and III.B. Clark actually adopts two ideal types that have
shareholder wealth maximization as a basic description. "Dualism" refers to a "norm of strict
profit maximization" and strictly separates this private function from any public obligations.
CLARK, supra note 15, at 677-78; see supra note 179 (discussing dualist view of corporate law).
"Monism" operates according to the same economic principle, but sees a "long-run identity
between public and private interests," which translates into allowing for "some set of 'socially
responsible' corporate activities that it is good for corporations to foster because doing so will
eventually create a better climate or culture in which business can operate." CLARK, supra note
15, at 681.
190. As Professor Eisenberg has characterized this view,
The concept that a corporation ought to act within the boundaries set by law
might seem self-evident. Unfortunately, it is not. Some persons take the position that
a corporation is free to decide whether to obey a given legal rule on the basis of a
kind of cost-benefit analysis, in which probable corporate gains are weighed either
against probable social costs, measured by the dollar [amount of] liability imposed
for engaging in such conduct, or probable corporate losses, measured by dollar
[amount of] liability discounted for likelihood of detection.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance-Two Models of the
Corporation, 17 CREIGHTrON L. Rav. 1, 8 (1983).
191. See, e.g., id. at 10 ("while a breach of contract may violate the moral norm that
promises should be kept, it is not clear that the obligation of contract is separately supported
by the norm of obedience to law").
192. In fact, given the complexity of environmental regulation, it is often difficult for
businesses to achieve full compliance with all environmental regulations that affect them. A
"good faith" effort to comply in these situations may furnish a moral equivalent.
193. CLARK, supra note 15, at 684.
194. Id. at 684-85.
195. The example is worth repeating:
Consider ... a complex water pollution statute and the elaborate administrative
regulations that implement it. For a given corporation that has long been accustomed
to discharge pollutants into rivers next to its factories, the estimated cost of compliance
is $10 million. There is no honest doubt, let us assume, about which regulations
apply to the corporation, whether they are legally valid, and how they are supposed
to be met. There is only a small probability, however, that if the corporation falls
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corporate managers to calculate whether the costs of compliance outweigh
the estimated penalty discounted by the chances of getting caught? Or must
managers try to "do the right thing" and comply with the law (at least to
the greatest extent feasible)? 1' 6
It is telling that Clark describes the view that advocates following the
law as "modest idealism." An ethical value is implicit in the view that one
should follow the law. The idea that businesses may take a different view-
namely, to maximize shareholder wealth without regard to duties of legal
compliance that conflict with this objective-paints a pessimistic picture of
corporate law and, one must add, the possibility of socially enlightened
corporate management. Milton Friedman, however, provides cause for op-
timism. Although a prophet of "profit maximization," he agrees that the
economic objective of corporate law is limited by "the basic rules of
society," including those "embodied in law.' 9
C. The Ethical Dimension
Both the economic objective and the value of following the law are
aspects of the normative complexity of corporate law that involve ethical
or moral judgments. In other words, both the economic objective and value
of following the law are judged good for society.19 My claim in this section
is that an ethical dimension of corporate law extends beyond this level of
normative complexity.
to comply with the regulations its noncompliance will be both discovered and corrected
(through successful legal proceedings) by the regulators. The corporation expects that
if there is discovery and successful enforcement, it will incur additional legal fees, a
modest fine, and delayed expenditure of $10 million for compliance. Using their best
business judgment, the managers discount these costs by their probability of occurrence
and by their futurity, and they conclude that the estimated present value of these
costs of noncompliance is only $2 million. Thus, compared to compliance, noncom-
pliance has a net present value of $8 million. From a purely profit-maximizing point
of view, the managers may decide not to comply with the pollution regulations, unless
and until the regulators bring legal proceedings specifically against their corporation.
The modest idealist would say that the managers should not be guided by a cost-
benefit analysis that takes the probability of successful enforcement into account, but
should cause their corporation to comply with the regulations promptly.
Id. at 685.
196. I add the parenthetical qualification because at least in some complex regulatory
situations in environmental law it may not be possible to know for certain that one's business
is in compliance or fully in compliance at all times, even with the best available technologies
in place. Or it sometimes occurs, again given the complexity of environmental regulation, that
complying with one environmental regulation actually conflicts with complying with another.
197. See infra note 204.
198. Professor Bratton discusses the ethical underpinning of economic arguments for
shareholder wealth maximization in terms of the overall economic welfare of society. William
W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights,
50 WASH. & LEE L. R v. 1449, 1462-64 (1993).
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1. Justice and Corporate Law
Dean Karen Newman argues in The Just Organization that the broad
normative value of "justice" should become a major component of the
structure and culture of business. 199 I consider .here the role corporate law
may play in the context of this aspiration.
Consider first Dean Newman's description of a just organization. A
just organization develops a "culture" that includes "the norms,, values,
and assumptions that form the foundation for interaction in the firm."2
In turn, an organization's culture is composed of "subcultures" or what
are usefully called "moral climates," namely, "the perceptions of the
organization's members about practices and procedures that have moral
content, that exist in the realm of what the firm values, believes in, and
considers right.' '201
Corporate law makes room for these kinds of considerations. Returning
to the ALI's statement of the economic objective in section 2.01, an explicit
carve-out is made not only for the value of following the law discussed
above, 02 but also for ethical considerations.
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby
enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within
the boundaries set by law;
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
20 3
Some extremists may respond that allowing for ethical considerations
and broadly philanthropic purposes in corporate law is disruptive. They
may prefer a purer, exclusively economic, focus. 204 At least with respect to
199. Karen L. Newman, The Just Organization: Creating and Maintaining Justice in Work
Environments, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. Rav. 1489 (1993).
200. Id. at 1496.
201. Id.
202. See supra Part III.B.
203. ALI, supra note 106, § 2.01(b), at 69.
204. Dean Clark describes the practical argument for this perspective:
A single, objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored than a
multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable accommodation of all
affected interests.... [B]etter monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept
more accountable. They are more likely to do what they are supposed to do, and do
it efficiently.
CLARK, supra note 15, at 679. Interestingly, one of those often quoted for maintaining this
strict focus on the economic objective, Milton Friedman, in fact, makes an exception for ethics
as well as for law. Friedman writes:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employe
of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his. employers. That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which
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everyday management, however, corporate law as it is now allows for




The controversial constituency statutes, for example, confirm an ethical
dimension in corporate law.? By explicitly permitting managers discretion
to consider interests beyond shareholders, constituency statutes give man-
agers legal elbow room to be ethical, although they are not forced to be
good.2
The corporate right to make charitable contributions noted in the ALI's
section 2.01(3) is also explicitly recognized in state statutes. 2° Virtually all
states have adopted statutes allowing charitable giving from corporations,
and the levels of contribution are substantial. 2
Another area in which corporate law admits an ethical dimension is
reflected in the very language of fiduciary duties, especially the duties of
care and loyalty. Even though substantive application of these legal duties
may often fall short of what some may desire ideally, the overtly ethical
language used to describe the duties of corporate executives probably has
real effect. 21 0
In connection with the ethical dimension, it is also important to em-
phasize that equity, and the power of courts to look to considerations of
fairness, plays a large role in corporate law, especially in the important
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical
custom.
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. Tums, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32, 33 (emphasis added). Proof that
Milton Friedman is at least a "modest idealist" in Clark's typology, and perhaps morel
205. In certain situations, the economic objective takes precedence. For instance, when a
decision is made to sell a company, the rule in Delaware is a relatively straightforward economic
one of selling to the highest bidder. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
Nos. 427,1993, 428,1993, 1993 WL 544314, at *6-9 (Del. Dec. 9, 1993); Paramount Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
206. See supra Part III.A.6.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 173-78.
208. ALI, supra note 106, § 2.01, at 92-93; e.g., Rav. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 3.02(13)
(1984).
209. ALI, supra note 106, § 2.01, at 92-93 (noting that "[v]irtualy all states have now
adopted statutory provisions relating to corporate contributions"). Historically, corporate giving
has risen from about .5% of pretax net income in the 1930s, to the level of a "one-percent
rule" in the 1950s and holding constant through the 1970s, and increasing to an average of
around two percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Michael Useem, Introduction to F.
EMERSON ANDREws, CoRoRAiON Grvnr 4-5 (1993). For Fortune 500 companies in 1990,
charitable contributions amounted to about one percent of worldwide pretax net income. ALI,
supra note 106, § 2.01, at 92 (citing The Conference Board, Survey of Corporate Contributions
(1990)).
210. Clark, supra note 10, at 75-76, 78-79 (arguing language courts use in describing
fiduciary duties amounts to "sermonizing," but "moral rhetoric" can sometimes "bolster norms
in some contexts"); Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty?
Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance,
61 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 954, 965-69 (1993) (arguing that "fiduciary rhetoric" plays "socializing
role" in corporate law).
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Delaware courts.211 Indeed, the equitable power of courts to consider basic
fairness in making and applying corporate law overlays an expansive ethical
quilt on the body of corporate law.
2 12
Dean Newman also argues specifically for recognition of the importance
of a just work environment for employees. Included is a need for procedural
fairness in decisionmaking about employment. 213 Although corporate man-
agers commonly turn to the written rules of employment or labor law in
these situations, Newman counsels a more proactive ethical approach. Simply
following the law is not enough. Traditional protections of the business
judgment rule and the duty of care, together with constituency statutes,
give managers plenty of latitude to build just organizations. They can legally
heed Dean Newman's call if they wish.
If it is true, as Newman claims, that just organizations will improve
employee performance, one would expect that the economic markets will
select for justice. As Newman writes,
The first question to ask is why people should try to build and
maintain just organizations. What good does justice do in an
organization? Our results suggest that the perception of voice-the
opportunity to be heard, be informed, and be involved-is critical
for increasing employees' commitment to the firm, securing their
willingness to work hard, and producing better performance out-
comes ....
In addition, the perception that one is treated with honesty and
respect by coworkers results in greater work effort. Therefore, the
first reason to create just organizations is to improve organizational
performance.
21 4
Perhaps justice in economic organization can come this easily, and it is
only a matter of time before managers see the true connection between
justice and economic efficiency. However, in the nature of things, I suspect
that Newman's second reason for pursuing justice-that "it is a valuable
goal in and of itself" 215-will sometimes require trading off economic values.
These are tough ethical choices that corporate law allows managers to make,
but does not require.
2. Ethics in Corporate Finance: The Case of Marriott
To illustrate another aspect of the ethical dimension in corporate law,
consider the recent reorganization of Marriott Corporation. On October 5,
211. The Delaware Court of Chancery, of course, is a court of equity.
212. Chancellor Allen has remarked: "This court, being a court of equity, tries to bring
to its function the most sensitive regard for the moral sentiments that lie below the surface of
legal rules." Massey, supra note 108, at 698 (quoting Mazzetti v. Sheppard, No. 8198, slip op.
at 10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 1987)).
213. Newman, supra note 199, at 1499-1501.




1992, Marriott Corporation announced that it planned to spin off its hotel
operations from its real estate business to create two separate companies,
Marriott International (mainly the hotel business) and Marriott Host (mainly
real estate). 216 Marriott shareholders were to receive a special dividend of
shares in Marriott International. 217 The price of Marriott shares jumped up
12% on the day of the announcement. 218 Not so happy was the plight of
Marriott's bondholders. The reorganization plan called for Marriott Host
to receive almost all of the old Marriott Corporation's debt.219 More
precisely, Marriott Host would retain almost $3 billion of the long-term
debt, while Marriott International would bear only about $20 million. And
because the Marriott Host side of the business had, in the previous year,
only $1.7 billion in revenue and $350 million cash flow, as compared with
$7.4 billion in revenue and $500 million cash flow for Marriott International,
the bond market quickly corrected for the new risk.- 0 The worth of Marriott
bonds fell 30% in two days.22 Bonds and preferred stock were immediately
downgraded m Formerly investment-grade bonds were reclassified as junk.2
Bondholders predictably reacted to Marriott's plan of reorganization
with passion. One institutional bondholder exclaimed, "It really is just an
outrage."'2' A spokesman for Marriott responded with a calm and stately
invocation of corporate law: "We have a fiduciary obligation to stockhold-
ers, and this transaction is in the best interests of stockholders." "Our
obligation to bondholders," he continued in the language of the law, but
with hidden laughter, "is to make all the bond payments on time and to
pay off the principal on time. We plan to fulfill that obligation.'"'22
The trouble of course was that the bondholders had failed to negotiate
covenants in the bond issues to protect themselves against restructurings
like the one Marriott was undertaking. Some bondholders blamed them-
selves, observing that investors, in rushing to lock in certain rates, often
bought bonds without protection. 26 Others who may also have blamed
themselves, also blamed Marriott's management, and filed lawsuits in federal
court and in Delaware.
216. Eben Shapiro, Marriott to Spin Off Hotel-Management Business, N.Y. TwES, Oct.
6, 1992, at Dl.
217. Id.
218. Constance Mitchell, Marriott Plan Enrages Holders of Its Bonds, WALL ST. J., Oct.
7, 1992, at Cl, C19.
219. Id.
220. Robin G. Blumenthal, Marriott to Split Its Business into 2 Entities, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 1992, at A3, All.
221. Mitchell, supra note 218, at Cl.
222. Blumenthal, supra note 220, at All.
223. Anne Newman, Marriott Corp. Modifies Plan to Split in Two, WALL ST. J., Mar.
12, 1993, at A2.
224. Mitchell, supra note 218, at Cl.
225. Id. at C19.
226. Id.
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In federal district court in Maryland, fifteen institutional investors who
held Marriott bonds sued under the federal securities laws.227 They alleged
that Marriott's management had failed to disclose plans to restructure the
corporation by splitting it in two. z2 a Although the court dismissed for lack
of evidence claims based on plans made before April 1992, it allowed to
go forward securities and state common-law claims about plans after that
date. "29 Allegedly, Marriott had hired a team of prominent investment
bankers and law firms to formulate the reorganization plan, code-named
"Project Chariot." 0 Also, plaintiffs alleged that at least one member of
the board of directors, a professor at Harvard Business School, resigned in
protest over the unfairness of the plan.Y
In reaction to displeasure of its bondholders, and perhaps to adverse
publicity as well, Marriott modified its plan in March 1993, negotiating
with institutional holders of $400 million of the debt. Under the revised
plan, $450 million of debt was forwarded to Marriott International, and an
exchange plan was adopted to improve the rates in a proposed debt swap.
2
After Judge Alexander Harvey denied Marriott's motion to dismiss, 3
Marriott shareholders approved the spinoff in July 1993. By that time,
stock prices for Marriott had increased 60% .234 Marriott family members
owned 25% of the outstanding shares. 5 The split was completed in October
1993.2 6 Although some bondholders have been made close to whole, one





Meanwhile, preferred shareholders, in much the same boat as the
bondholders, were not faring better in Delaware Chancery Court. Four
institutional investors, including among them the President and Fellows of
227. As is usual, but often inconsequential, the complaint also included state law claims
of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
228. PPM Am., Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 820 F. Supp. 970, 971-72 (D. Md. 1993).
229. Id. at 979-80.
230. Id. at 972.
231. Id.
232. Other details included Marriott International agreeing to provide as much as $125
million in financing for the Philadelphia Marriott under construction and to provide $200
million extra in a credit line to Marriott Host. Marriott Corporation also agreed to issue $70
million in stock to retire bonds. Newman, supra note 223, at A2.
233. This included denial of a motion for partial summary judgment.
234. Jyoti Thottam, Marriott Holders Approve Plan to Split Real Estate and Hotels,
Making 2 Firms, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1993, at B4.
235. Id.
236. Plan to Split into Two Businesses Completed, N.Y. Tnmrs, Oct. 9, 1993, at 41.
237. Thottam, supra note 234, at B4 (quoting Larry Kill). Suggesting a bit of evidence
that the capital markets may not be as efficient as some like to think, Marriott International
had little trouble selling $150 million in new 10-year notes in early December 1993. One
professional market analyst complained, "They are not paying a big penalty for what they have
done to their bond holders." Jonathan Fuerbringer, Brief Memory Aids Marriott Issue, N.Y.
Tbm, Dec. 3, 1993, at D14 (quoting Stephen Clark).
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Harvard College, filed suit in Delaware to stop the spinoff.3 They held
more than 50% of Marriott's only issued cumulative convertible preferred
stock (Series A).239 Plaintiffs claimed the special dividend planned for
common shareholders violated their rights as preferred shareholders.-
°
Chancellor Allen issued two opinions in the case. First, he held that
under the circumstances, the Marriott directors owed no duty of care to
the preferred shareholders. Although some Delaware Chancery cases had
found a duty of care to extend to preferred shareholders in certain circum-
stances, 4 Chancellor Allen remarked that "it is often not analytically
helpful to ask the global question whether (or to assert that) the board of
directors does or does not owe fiduciary duties ... to the holders of
preferred stock.' 1242 He concluded that "the question whether duties ...
are implicated by corporate action affecting preferred stock is a question
that demands reference to the particularities of context to fashion a sound
reply."' 4- Because the preferred stock in Marriott carried conversion rights
into common, and because the conversion rights contemplated the possibility
of special dividends in a provision for adjusting the conversion price in just
such an event,'" Chancellor Allen held that the Marriott directors did not
owe fiduciary duties to the preferred shareholders under the circumstances.
Instead, whether "this transaction does wrongfully favor the common stock
is a question of contract law."'-"
The second case addressed the contract claims.'-" There, the preferred
shareholders alleged violation of their contractual rights (1) to choose
whether to exercise their conversion rights, (2) to be accorded a dividend
preference over common shareholders, (3) to vote for or against the proposed
spinoff, and (4) to be fully protected under the conversion provision.2 7
Plaintiffs also alleged an elaborate "machiavellian" scheme of fraud.2A1 To
make a long story short, Chancellor Allen held that none of the claims had
sufficient merit to grant a preliminary injunction against the planned spinoff.
238. HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS
90 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993).
239. Id. at *2.
240. Id. at *4-5.
241. Id. at *15-16 (citing Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1943);
MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 157 A. 396 (Del. Ch. 1928)). Chancellor Allen also
distinguished one of his own opinions in which he had recently held that a merger negotiated
by a board elected solely by common stockholders had to be shown "not unfair to the preferred
stock." Id. at *16 (citing In re FLS Holdings, Inc., No. 12623, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 2, 1993)).
242. Id. at *16.
243. Id. at *17.
244. Id. at *18-19.
245. Id. at *21.
246. HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS
105 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993).
247. Id. -at *2-3.
248. Id. at *3, *24.
1993] 1609
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1565
Because the plaintiffs' conversion privileges would not survive the spinoff, 49
they felt forced by the merger to convert their shares into common.
Chancellor Allen found persuasive language in the conversion provision that
specifically contemplated the possibility of a special dividend being paid,
and he held that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on the merits. The
spinoff could go forward.
Although all the chips have not fallen in the Marriott series of cases
and transactions, 210 enough has happened to offer some thoughts on the
ethical dimension of corporate law. First, although bondholders have no
absolute legal claim to fiduciary duties from directors, at least in Delaware, 25
the sheer massiveness of the potential unfairness involved leads one to
question whether some sort of fiduciary duty to bondholders should apply.
212
The apparent wealth transfer to the Marriott family alone-a 60% increase
from about $17 per share to around $26 per share, with the Marriott family
holding about 25% of the total (25 million shares), yields a lot of money
(roughly $225 millon)-at least raises the question whether corporate law
should sanction what looks like an overt taking from unwary or unthinking
investors.
Professor Kenneth Lehn, however, argues that "[g]ranting extracon-
tractual rights to bondholders would throw roadblocks in the way of
249. See, e.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CAL.
L. REv. 243, 287-88 (1954) ("Mergers and consolidations which create a new company and end
the existence of the constituent corporations also end conversion privileges.").
250. As of this writing, all but one of the bondholder suits had settled. Fuerbringer, supra
note 237. The PPM America case remained. Id.
251. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (no fiduciary duty to convertible
debenture holder until conversion to stock). This rule is relaxed in near-insolvency situations.
See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications, C.A. No. 12150, 1991
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., No. 12406
(Del. Ch. June 18, 1992); see also Orts, supra note 23, at 115-23 (discussing possible affect of
constituency statutes on near-insolvency situations in connection with Credit Lyonnais).
252. The argument in favor of some level of fiduciary duty to bondholders is made in
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165
(1990); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRP. L. 205 (1988). Others
argue for expanded interpretation of contractual principles to protect bondholders within the
traditional framework. E.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal
Restructuring in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92"(1988); cf. also Victor Brudney,
Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HAiv. L. REv.
1821 (1992) (suggesting that voluntary debt adjustments unfairly disadvantage public bondhold-
ers); John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained
Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1207 (1991) (discussing
problem of bondholder coercion by issuers who unfairly use threat of bankruptcy or adverse
indenture amendments). But see, e.g., David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders' Rights and the Case
for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1991) (concluding that "negotiation
of improved covenants and careful credit pricing is a better objective than a revolution in
bondholder remedies"); Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The Corporation, the
Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J.L. & Comm. 187, 209 (1991) ("[AII of the case law to
date is, if anything, squarely opposed to the idea that a fiduciary duty to bondholders can




corporate restructurings that promote economic efficiency." 213 But what
does he mean by economic efficiency? In the Marriott cases, it seems clear
that a significant amount of stock gain was acquired at the expense of
bondholder losses. This transfer does not support an argument for economic
efficiency, except to say that it may prove more efficient for some to off-
load indebtedness and risk to others.
As a matter of policy, it may make sense to retain the traditional rule
that bondholders must contract for protections from events such as spinoffs
that may otherwise harm them. In the Marriott cases, the covenants in the
bond indentures were "quite skimpy," neglecting to include, for example,
"event risk covenants."12 4 And perhaps investors should have known about
the potential of a spinoff, given that "[dlozens of spinoffs have been
announced by large companies in recent years." m5 One wonders, however,
what might come next. Are bondholders, as a matter of law, to remain at
the mercy of creative financial restructuring? Are their investments always
to be subject to the possibility of a new way to circumvent formalistic
contracts? Or are there limits?
Chancellor Allen, in his opinions, seems to recognize ethical limits. In
the case of the preferred shareholders, however, it appears that the preferred
share contract provided exactly for the possibility of the "event risk" of a
spinoff. Because the event was clearly foreseen and negotiated in contractual
terms, the court refused to reach out and decide the case on undeveloped
legal principles. At the same time, the close attention to facts and fairness
in the Marriott cases gives good reason to doubt apocalyptic claims about
what will happen if fiduciary duties are recognized for preferred shareholders
and bondholders when circumstances warrant. In this sense, the emerging
law of nonshareholder fiduciary duties illustrates how the ethical dimension
of corporate law animates directions in its development.
3. Toward Ethical Corporate Law
One of the reasons Professor Lehn does not wish to see expansion of
corporate fiduciary duties to include bondholders who suffer losses in cases
like Marriott is that he fears that "[p]roviding bondholders with protections
that they did not contract for could pave the way for other stakeholders to
assert similar claims." 256 Lehn worries that employees, for example, "could
argue that a spinoff or other restructuring harmed them and that they
should be compensated for their losses, even though their labor contracts




This kind of worry makes some sense, but not much. First, the days
may be numbered when one can safely count employees outside the subject




257. Id. For an argument for precisely this kind of movement in corporate law toward
protecting employees, see O'Connor, supra note 9.
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area of corporate law.25s Second, even if Lehn's point is accepted, his
"slippery slope" argument is not very persuasive. Courts draw lines and
make distinctions all the time from case to case. Fear of slippery slopes or
camel's noses in tents should deter neither judges, nor legislators, from
using their legitimate powers to move corporate law toward more just
results .25
9
Reformers of all stripes should remember that corporate law carries
within it a complex array of normative values, not only economic values,
which themselves are often divided and difficult to fathom, but also values
of abiding by the law and other principles of ethical business behavior.
Tradeoffs among values are sometimes required, and intelligent law reform,
whether through legislatures or the courts, requires an awareness of the
various purposes served by different rules in different contexts. Reformers
as well as traditionalists should make choices with a full realization of the
conflicting normative complexity involved in the subject of corporate law.
IV. Tim LEGITIMACY OF A COMPLEX CoRPoRATE LAW
I began this Article with a discussion of H.L.A. Hart's injunction not
to begin theorizing about corporate law with a definition of "the corpora-
tion." The admonition is perspicacious, because corporate law does not
follow any unified conception of the corporation. What is needed is a
theory of corporate law that takes into account its technical and normative
complexity. 2
60
Technical complexity in corporate law may result from normative con-
flicts, as well as from a reflection of the complexity of modern business
practice. 261 Some simplification of the technical complexity of corporate law
may be desirable. 262 But the social complexity of business and modem
society probably poses limits to the extent the technical complexity of
corporate law can be reduced, although valiant efforts such as the ALI's
Principles of Corporate Governance are nonetheless worthy. 263
258. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 128; Stone, supra note 128.
259. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1985).
260. Cf. F.S.C. NoRTHRUP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEOAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE 5 (1959)
("Since legal experience is complex, especially so in the contemporary world.., we must expect
to have to go where the specific character of the complexities takes us and to be led to a theory
and method of law which is complex also.").
261. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to AmmiucAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIP.ES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIs AND RECOMMENDATIONS at x (Proposed Final Draft,
Mar. 31, 1992) ("Corporate governance involves the management of substantial enterprises. The
general management of a substantial enterprise is a complex and dynamic process requiring
continual practical responses by necessarily fallible agents exercising power and authority under
conditions that are usually subject to unremitting change and often great uncertainty."); see
also supra notes 4, 1.19-21, 130-52 and accompanying text.
262. For a general discussion of the phenomenon of legal complexity and prospects for
law reform efforts to reduce it, see Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 42 DuKE L.J. 1 (1992).
263. ALI, supra note 106. The ALI's Principles in fact illustrate how the subject matter
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In addition, technical complexity is not always bad. On one hand, a
complex body of law may increase transaction costs for those attempting
to follow it.2 In the case of corporate law, companies must hire very
expensive lawyers to find the law and to divine likely judicial reactions
concerning complex deals or litigation. On the other. hand, technical legal
complexity may reflect growing complexity in society generally.2 65 For ex-
ample, more complexity in corporate finance is likely to increase complexity
in corporate law.
Even though legal complexity is often spoken of as "an evil to be
minimized," it can also result in "benefits from rules that are more precisely
tailored to particular behavior." 2 6 Corporate fiduciary duties provide a
good example. Predicting exactly how a court will apply a general fiduciary
principle to a particular transaction is often difficult, especially given the
fast-paced movement of the law and the complexity of factual business
situations. But a more complex body of law may make prediction in a
specific case easier and surer. If so, then a greater degree of certainty in
knowing what types of corporate behavior courts will accept or condemn
may offset greater expenditures in transaction costs. In other words, by
expressing more detailed standards for appropriate behavior, technical legal
complexity may provide social benefits. 267
The normative complexity of corporate law is another matter. As noted
above, the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance recognizes the nor-
mative complexity of corporate law. 26 Many who are influenced strongly
of corporate law virtually compels a complex theory to account for it. Some commentators
representing diverse ideological orientations condemn the Principles as failing to enact or advance
their particular theories of the corporation or corporate law. See, e.g., Symposium, The American
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REa. 871 (1993) (in
which, despite the diversity of scholarly commentary, it is difficult to find a good word said
about the Principles). In my view, the ALI's refusal to adopt any universal theory of the
corporation is a considerable virtue.
264. Schuck, supra note 262, at 18 ("A more complex law entails many significant
transaction costs which must be accounted for.").
265. Id. ("If we suppose that legal rules are largely epiphenomenal, reflecting the underlying
social conditions to which they relate, then we might want law's complexity to keep pace with
society's. Social complexity is growing remorselessly.").
266. Louis K, Low, A MODEL Or THE OPTIMAA. CoMPLExrry OF Runs 23 (National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3958, 1992).
267. Id. at I ("Rules that are more complex can be more precisely tailored to acts, thereby
allowing better control of behavior."); id. at 23 ("For example, the more is spent by individuals
before acting to understand the applicable rules, the more -individuals' behavior will conform
to the desired outcome. Thus, evaluations of complexity and measurements of compliance costs
will be useful in formulating policy only if considered in connection with the effects of more
highly differentiated rules on behavior.").
268. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03. I distinguish between technical and nor-
mative complexity in corporate law for purposes of orderly explanation. I do not suggest that
two types of rules, technical and normative, exist in contradistinction. As Chancellor Allen has
observed,
[A] judgment concerning the wisdom of a specific legal rule requires "thick" sub-
stantive information about the systemwide operation of the rule under review and its
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by economic models, however, have a lot to say about how corporate law
can be made more single-mindedly efficient. In many instances, their advice
has already been followed. But this path toward a more efficient corporate
law may have other normative costs. A theory of corporate law must take
into account the complex nature of its subject, including the fact that many
of the rules of corporate law have developed over time and reflect not only
economic, but other normative principles. 269 Policymakersi must choose how
economic goals are to be framed and how corporate enterprises may proceed
to achieve them. They must also choose what normative constraints, such
as the values of following the law and ethical business behavior, should
remain or should be added to. the body of corporate legal principles.
If nothing else, one reason to suggest a complex conception of corporate
law is to oppose competing economic theories of the corporation, which
are both multifarious and often nefarious. Not only must reductionist
theories of corporate law be disputed when they make no sense or fail to
comport with realities of corporate law, but alternative theories must be
proposed and defended. 270 Otherwise, slogans like "the corporation is a
nexus of contracts" capture the imagination, and the sure and confident
answers of analyses that look mainly to a single variable will succeed in
moving the law in a certain direction with potentially dangerous social
consequences.
Corporate law involves the rules of the game that govern a complex set
of legal relationships. It is set in motion by relatively simple documents
filed by businesses with the government, which create for some purposes a
single "corporate entity." But corporate law is also concerned with an array
of rules and principles governing the resulting economic relationships and
business structures. No such thing as "a corporation" exists that is severable
from the complexity of its legal relationships. To say Exxon is the sum of
its parts-its employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other de-
fined participants-along with contracts made among these participants and
property held in Exxon's name on behalf of various participants, leaves out
key issues of legal structure and governance. Corporate law helps to connect
the myriad of economic relationships within Exxon in the form of express
or relational contracts, thus providing something of a roadmap of economic
connections. 271 More importantly, corporate law provides the legal frame-
alternatives and a clear understanding concerning the various ends (values) the system
(and, thus, the rule) ought (normatively) to seek to promote.
William T. Allen, Law and Markets as Social Products, in THE BATTLE FOR COR'ORATE CONTROL
153 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1990). In corporate law, technical and normative complexity
interrelate and coexist.
269. Professor Bratton recognizes this aspect of corporate law when he writes, for example,
that "the fiduciary rules that we have in corporate law come down to us as artifacts of ethical
judgments rendered in the past." Bratton, supra note 198, at 1454.
270. As Professor Bratton writes about the "Chicago story" with its "prevailing vision of
the corporation as a wealth-creating mechanism," "[it really will take a theory to beat this
theory." Id. at 1464.
271. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis.
L. Rav. 483, 492 ("And the corporation itself is one of the greatest relational contracts ever.").
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work for the positive freedoms and negative constraints that structure
corporate power. Corporate law provides for the board of directors and its
committees, a management hierarchy, rules by which corporate business
functions-charter, by-laws, corporate codes of conduct-and statutory and
common-law rules of permissible business behavior. Only when the complex
nature of these various legal rules and relationships is comprehended, or at
least imagined, does it make sense to speak of Exxon, metaphorically, as
''a corporation.'' 272
From this perspective, economic theories of the firm are seriously
inadequate. They tend to focus only on economic and financial relationships
involved in a corporation, and to the extent they include legal matters, their
discussion is usually confined to such principles as limited liability.273 This
is too grudging a view of the role of law. The economic and financial
relationships contemplated are governed by corporate legal rules, some
mandatory and some enabling. Even if what has been unhappily called
"enablingism" in corporate law prevailed completely, supplanting all man-
datory rules of corporate law with free contracting principles, law would
remain essential. 274 The corporate contracts would depend on the legal
structures of both courts (for the resolution of disputes and the doctrinal
development of corporate contract law) and lawyers (both as drafters of
corporate documents and litigators of how to interpret them).
. Economic theories of the firm also tend to ignore the relationships of
power that the rules of corporate law set in place. A corporation is not
merely a nexus of contracts among individuals; it also involves relationships
of power, control, and discretionary authority. And the laws that govern
these relationships of economic power are normatively, as well as technically,
complex. What a corporation is depends always on the legal context of why
the question is being asked.
Given the normative and technical complexity of corporate law, the
"legitimacy" of the business corporation as a complex legal and economic
phenomenon remains an enduring theoretical issue. Professor Richard Bux-
baum writes:
It is fashionable today to disparage concern with the social and
political legitimacy of corporate economic actors. This is due in
part to scholarly doubts about the reasons for concern and in part
to a resurgent corporatist ideology per se. In greatest part, however,
it is due to a despairing optimism, a kind of perverse panglossian
272. The theory advanced here shares similarities with the theory of corlborate law advanced
by Professor Bratton. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-
Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 180, 185 (1992) (suggesting that "the corporation
is a complex of relationships-legal, political, and social, as well as economic").
273. See supra note 40.
274. See Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its Future, 81 CoLuM. L. Rv.
1611, 1653 (1981) (citing Donald Schwartz, The Paradigm of Federal Chartering, in CoAMEN-
TARIEs ON CORPORAa STRCraUR AND Gow NAcE 332-33 (Donald E. Schwartz ed., 1979)
(footnotes omitted)); see supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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view about our economic health and the role of the corporation in
maintaining or resurrecting it....
I believe that the insistence on legitimacy is inevitable and un-
changing, because it is voiced by those whose fates are affected by
decisions in which they do not participate-decisions made by
powerholders whom they do not elect.
275
In a similar vein, Professor George Lodge concludes that the legal idea of
the corporation is "floating in [a] philosophic limbo, dangerously vulnerable
to the charge of illegitimacy and to the charge that it is not amenable to
community control." 276
My own view is that the legitimacy of the corporation rests ultimately
on the same grounds that it always has: the legitimacy of the political and
legal system that sanctions and structures it. Given the normative complexity
of corporate law it cannot be otherwise. Corporate law cannot refer for
justification to a single normative value within it-either economic ration-
ality or ethical goodness. Instead, corporate law, like all law, relies for its
legitimacy on the political and legal system of which it is a part.
Some elaboration of the term "legitimacy" is required. Claims that
business corporations must be legitimate have been criticized as referring to
a "vague" term borrowed from political science. 277 Without going into
detail, I suggest that a legal theory of legitimacy may be understood on
three levels: legal validity, empirical legitimacy, and systemic legitimacy. 27
Corporations satisfy the first level of legal validity by ordinary compli-
ance with corporate legal rules and by acquiescing in the jurisdiction and
authority of the courts. One can imagine a future society where managers
of a large business corporation might grow so cynical, corrupt, and powerful
that they would flout the organized legal system. Such a regime of corpor-
atist tyranny would violate the basic norm of legal validity in a democracy. 279
Empirical legitimacy refers to the extent to which the people in a society,
namely, the general public, believe in the moral authority of the basic
structures of social power, in this case the legally constituted economic
power of business corporations. Events can shake this public faith. The
rampant paper entrepreneurialism of the 1980s, for example, may have
caused a relative decline in the empirical legitimacy of the corporate sys-
275. Richard M. Buxbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine,
45 Osno ST. L.J. 515, 517 (1984).
276. GEORGE C. LODGE, TnE NEw AmERIcAN IDEOLOGY 18 (1975).
277. See, e.g., Werner, supra note 274, at 1629 (the idea of legitimacy is "vague even in
its native field of political science and no less so in the corporate context").
278. For elaboration of this theoretical model of types of legitimacy, see Orts, supra note
182, at 267-70.
279. A number of technical legal issues also go to whether, for certain purposes, a
"corporation" is recognized as legally valid. These issues include defective or de facto incor-
poration and disregard of the corporate entity (or "piercing the corporate veil"). See, e.g.,
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LimTD PARTNERSHIPS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 234-95 (4th ed. 1990).
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tem. 210 A similar crisis in confidence during the 1970s brought concerns
about corporate legitimacy to the front burner of academic commentary. 2 '
Finally, systemic legitimacy refers to the extent to which "power is
acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of
consent. ' '2 2 To my mind, this is the type of legitimacy with which corporate
law theorists should be most concerned. The systemic legitimacy of corporate
law depends on the extent to which the processes of corporate governance
and power are tied to rational "law-making" and "law-applying" principles
and procedures. 283 For example, corporate law raises legitimacy problems in
connection with the "race for the bottom," whereby corporate managers
have historically been able to ratchet-down the level of regulatory oversight
of their business activities. 2m An outstanding question is whether and to
what extent this "race" has harmed the systemic legitimacy of corporate
law. One should not, by the way, prejudge the issue. It could well turn
out, for example, that although the historical race has been toward laxity,
the result has nonetheless been democratically ratified by rational apathy
of citizens to the resulting legal environment. Delaware may, in other words,
do a very good job of providing the kind of procedures and personnel
needed for systemic legitimacy.
2 5
Although I am attempting to use the concept of legitimacy more precisely
here, a perceived need for the legitimacy of corporate law is not new. The
concept burst on the academic scene in 1970 with publication of James
Willard Hurst's The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of
the United States.2 6 As Hurst points out, two major normative grounds
have informed the historical development of corporate law: "utility," which
is an old word for economic efficiency, and "responsibility." Hurst is the




280. For the original discussion of "paper entrepreneurialism" and its possible causes and
effects, see ROBERT B. REICH, Tam NEXT AMEmucAN FRONTIER 140-72 (1983).
281. For an historical overview, see Werner, supra note 274, at 1627-29, 1647-49.
282. Orts, supra note 182, at 267 (quoting DAVID BEETHAM, THE LErrIMATON OF POWER
15-20 (1991)).
283. See, e.g., id. at 268 (discussing "law-making" and "law-applying" conditions of
"procedural rationality" in Jirgen Habermas's social theory).
284. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (describing his view of "the race for the bottom"). But see, e.g.,
Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 920 (1982) (arguing from economic
view that competition among states is "a climb to the top").
285. See, e.g., LEwIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 5-9 (1993)
(emphasizing respect for Delaware courts, especially Court of Chancery, as well as developed
body of corporate case law); see also ROBERTA RomAMo, THE GENIUS OF AmERICAN CORPORATE
LAW 37-44 (1993) (emphasizing Delaware's legal and human capital, but also noting factors
that may tend to undercut legitimacy, such as Delaware's dependence on corporate franchise
taxes, its constitutional requirement of supermajority for amending Delaware's corporate code,
and its "reputation for responsiveness to corporate concerns").
286. See HURsT, supra note 153.
287. Id. at 58-111; see also Werner, supra note 274, at 1627-28.
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In his words, "[w]hat law permits or accepts, what it enforces or compels,
should be socially useful and socially responsible. ' 28 Because the two values
may diverge, choices must be made, through political and legal processes
which must themselves be legitimate, concerning what normative values
corporate law will follow.
Let me emphasize how my theory of the legitimacy of corporate law
differs from Hurst's. I agree that utility and responsibility remain important
values that are necessary for corporate law to remain viable. One reason
business corporations are accepted by the public is the perceived utility
gained from a relatively strict pursuit of the economic objective, as well as
the perceived responsibility that directors and managers exhibit in doing
their jobs. To the extent that these perceptions waver, the empirical legiti-
macy of the corporate system is threatened. More deeply, to the extent the
values of utility and responsibility become unhinged from the legally con-
stituted procedures of democratic government and judicial administration,
the systemic legitimacy of the corporate system falls into doubt. Although
Hurst uses "responsibility" to refer mainly to the traditional measure of
managerial accountability to shareholders, as well as legal regulation of
business external to corporate law (antitrust, tax, and other specialized
laws), 2 9 I would give the concept further scope so as to include other
aspects of the normative complexity of corporate law, such as its ethical
dimension.
290
The complexity of corporate law, therefore, requires a legal and political
"metatheory" to contain and justify it.291 Some may claim that a unidi-
mensional goal is necessary, resulting in recommendations for technical and
normative "reduction" of corporate law. This approach, however, risks
losing many of the traditional virtues of corporate law as it has developed.
Corporate law is complex, but on a metatheoretical level this is good,
because the reality of business and society that it comprehends is also
complex. What holds together the divergent technical and normative com-
plexity of corporate law is a basic faith in the legitimacy of the political
and legal system that supports it.
This theory of the legitimacy of corporate law can be usefully contrasted
with other theories that have been advanced. My theory does not, for
example, follow either the "Political Model" or the "Economic Model"
outlined by Professor Melvin Eisenberg.
292
According to the Political Model, the corporation is "essentially a
political institution, and the groups it most directly affects are its constit-
288. HURST, supra note 153, at 58.
289. Id. at 108-11.
290. See supra Part III.C.
291. Cf. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REv.
923, 924 (1984) (noting that construction of corporate law's general typology will be helpful in
assessing policy recommendations).
292. See Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 1.
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uencies." 293 Therefore, "the corporation's legitimacy depends upon the
extent to which it is governed by principles appropriate to a democratic
state." 294 The Political Model leads to proposals for splitting the economic
objective to include constituent groups, establishing a "balancing" role for
the board to mediate conflicting constituent interests, and placing constituent
directors on the board.
291
In comparison, the Economic Model "assume[s] that the corporation is
an economic institution, and that, as an empirical matter, the corporate
system is legitimated through three major bases.
'" 29
The first is a belief that placing control of the factors of production
and distribution in the hands of privately appointed corporate
managers, who are accountable for their performance and who act
in the interest and subject to the ultimate control of those who own
the corporation, achieves a more efficient utilization of economic
resources than that achievable under alternative economic systems.
The second is a belief that corporate managers are in fact account-
able for their performance. The third is a belief that the sharehold-
ers, as the owners of the corporation, have the ultimate right to
control it. 297
Eisenberg himself adheres to this view. He concludes that "it is sufficient
to point out that in our society control solely by virtue of ownership-
hands-on or hands-off-is a fully legitimating principle .... "298
It is this last statement with which I disagree. Although economic
efficiency provides an important normative justification for much of cor-
porate law, it is not sufficient for the legitimacy of an entire body of law
and the social institutions that operate according to that law. An efficient
corporate fascism is an extreme example that proves the point. Such a
system is not legitimate because it is not tied sufficiently to democratic
government and rational legal procedures. Economic efficiency or utility
alone cannot justify the structures of economic power set up under corporate
law. Instead, corporate law must derive from political and judicial bodies
that are recognized (critically and empirically) as legitimate. This higher
social, political, and legal level provides a source for the legitimacy of
corporate law that avoids the bind in which Eisenberg puts himself when
he adopts the Economic Model.
Other normative principles, even when they occasionally conflict with
the primary economic objective of corporate law, may nonetheless remain
fully legitimate within a broader legal and political system. At this level,
choices made in particular circumstances in particular areas of corporate
293. Id. at 2.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2-3.
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law may legitimately reflect a mix of values. The economic subject of
corporate law often answers to economic logic, either in practice or in
critical proposals for reform, but not always. In some areas, legal and
political decisionmakers in the system may determine that other normative
concerns are more important than competing economic values. 299
This does not mean that instead I am endorsing the Political Model.
Professor Lynne Dallas takes this approach, and my view differs also with
hers.3°° Like Eisenberg, Dallas advances two competing "models of corporate
governance," an "Efficiency Model" which is similar if not identical to
Eisenberg's Economic Model, and a "Power Model" which is similar to
Eisenberg's Political Model. 0 1 Dallas generally endorses her Power Model.3°2
However, considerable problems are raised by "politicizing" corporate law
in this manner, not the least of which 'is the predictable decline in the
economic efficiency of business enterprises that would result.A03 Huge costs
to social utility and economic productivity would result from adoption of
various political proposals recommending a "version of the corporation as
the Republic in miniature. ' '3G4 And this predictable decline of social utility
is probably the main reason why these proposals have remained only ideas
on paper. 05
My argument, in contrast, is that the technical and normative complexity
of corporate law, and its structuring of incorporated businesses, is legiti-
299. Professor Bratton captures this multi-dimensional normative aspect of corporate law
in his conception of a "mediative approach," by which he means "legal mediation" that "uses
practical reason to synchronize the competing demands and values of actors through the appeal
to legal principle." Bratton, supra note 272, at 214. As Bratton states correctly, "Where two
valid but inconsistent normative directives come to bear on a problem, mediation is required.
The choice between the two is a matter of judgment." Id. I extend the analysis to include the
question of the legitimacy of what Bratton calls, somewhat mechanically, "the mediative device,"
id. at 185, namely, the institutions of courts and legislatures, and how well they fulfill their
purposes of rational law-making and law-applying.
300. Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means,
22 U. MICH. J.L. REPF. 19 (1988).
301. Id. at 22-44.
302. Id. at 25-27, 34-36, 39-48.
303. When I presented an earlier draft of this Article at Rutgers-Newark School of Law,
I was asked for the basis of my belief that democratic employee-owned and operated businesses
would prove less efficient than hierarchically organized ones. A response is to ask why, if
economic democracy is more efficient, there are not more such enterprises in existence. If it is
true that hierarchical enterprises are, at least sometimes, more efficient than democratic ones,
then many people who want jobs may prefer to allow hierarchical enterprises to organize and
compete in society.
304. Chayes, supra note 159, at 39. Chayes, however, advances an argument along the
lines of constituency representation in corporate governance, especially for employees. Id. at
41-45.
305. Several prominent authors made proposals for political reform of corporate governance
in the 1970s. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAmINr THE GIANT CORPORATION 118-31 (1976)




mated through rational mechanisms of legal rules and process. 3°6 Neither a
strict Economic Model-requiring a clear showing of utility for every rule-
nor a Political Model of democratic corporate government needs to be
followed for legitimacy to result. Instead, the processes of corporate law
provide the necessary structure for governance of corporate enterprises.
State legislatures and courts provide the essential legal underpinning for
"the corporation." 30 7 As Chancellor Allen has said, "it is the corporate law
that governs the inner-working of corporations and thus it is corporate law
that legitimizes and limits the exercise of corporate power within the
corporation." 0 '
Given the immense social power and influence of modern business
corporations, issues of corporate law are too important to be left only to
courts, experts, or interested parties in litigation. The public at large should
also be concerned. As Professor Chayes advises,
Though our problem is elusive,. . . we ignore it at our peril. Like
societies before us, we will be ill-advised to rely exclusively on the
conscience or benevolence of the wielders of power to secure that
it be exercised for the ends we value. Power in its manifold guises
must be submitted to the rule of law: that is, to the governance of
reason.3c 9
CONCLUSION
I have argued for a nonreductionist theory of corporate law that respects
its technical and normative complexity. And I have advanced these argu-
ments in terms of an analysis of how corporate law actually operates.
First, I established that corporate law is complex in the sense of involving
a number of technical rules expressed in state corporate codes, as well as
common-law principles such as fiduciary duties. Exceptions and special rules
govern various particular subjects and circumstances. More generally, cor-
porate law is concerned with the structure of organized economic power.
In regulating the major type of business form in contemporary society,
306. As Professor Chayes argues,
mo the extent that we are prepared to recognize centers of significant nongovern-
mental power within our society, they too must be subjected to the rule of law. It is
implicit in the ideal ... that the processes and institutions of the society be organized
so as to give reasonable assurance that significant power will be exercised not
arbitrarily, but in a manner that can be rationally related to the legitimate purposes
of society.
Chayes, supra note 159, at 31.
307. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 127, at 1309 (observing that "to the extent that democratic
processes are necessary to legitimate any substantial public or quasi-public power, those processes
are implicit in the legislation that creates and empowers the corporation").
308. Massey, supra note 108, at 688 (quoting William T. Allen, Competing Conceptions
of the Corporation in American Law, Rocco J. Tresolini Lecture in Law at Lehigh University
(Oct. 29, 1990)).
309. Chayes, supra note 159, at 45.
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corporate law is a mix of power-conferring (enabling and suppletory) and
duty-imposing (mandatory) rules.
Second, corporate law is normatively complex. It involves different
types of economic values, not just one magical principle of shareholder
wealth maximization. Even if one wished to reduce corporate law by a
totalitarian implementation of economics, this science, as applied to the
complex matter of business organization, does not yield uncontroversial
results. One reason is that the "economic correctness" of any particular
legal rule or principle often depends on the perspective from which the
question is asked. Is the point of view of shareholders the only one that
matters? If so, which shareholders matter most? Should large institutional
investors predominate? Are the interests of short-term and long-term inves-
tors necessarily consonant? Moreover, should the rules and principles of
corporate law sometimes look beyond shareholders? For instance, should
corporate law sometimes protect creditors or employees?
And beyond economics, beyond the economic interests of participants
in corporate enterprises, a ruthlessly efficient corporate law may have
adverse social effects with respect to a range of noneconomic factors
managers may otherwise wan to consider in making decisions. For example,
would a totally efticient corporate law allow managers to consider the
impact business decisions may have on the natural environment? May they
adopt proactive programs to benefit the environment (for example, recycling
and waste reduction programs or environmental management and auditing
systems) even if they adversely affect the bottom line? What about a host
bf other ethical issues that confront businesses daily?
In fact, positive corporate law already answers many of these questions,
implicitly if not explicitly. It embraces a number of different kinds of
economic and social values. Often, economic considerations prevail, but in
many areas corporate law also takes to heart other ethical, legal, and
political principles.
Understanding the complex nature of corporate law teaches some lessons
for proponents of law reform. First, the technical complexity of corporate
law suggests that piecemeal reform may lead to better results than attempting
to overhaul the entire subject. If large changes are desired, then a detailed
survey of the existing law is needed first to avoid unanticipated adverse
consequences. Corporate law is a very large and complicated social machine
with which to tinker. Second, the normative complexity of corporate law
should be kept firmly in mind as new directions are sought. 10 New directions
310. A number of developments suggest that corporate law is destined to take new directions
in one way or another. As Chancellor Allen observes, "There are unmistakable signs that we
may be on the cusp of a new era [in corporate law]." Massey, supra note 108, at 778 (quoting
William T. Allen, A Glimpse of the Struggle for Board Autonomy in American Corporation
Law, Address at Stanford University Law School (Apr. 5, 1990)). Two trends contributing to
the flux are the rise of institutional investors and increasing concern for the impact of corporate
law on interests beyond those of shareholders. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon,
Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law: Who's in Control?, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1177,
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in corporate law are exciting to contemplate. At the same time, many
traditional legal principles retain a great deal of strength, if only courts and
legislatures would reinvigorate them.
. Finally, if reductionist models are followed, corporate law will not turn
in a happy direction. Neither reconfiguring corporate law to fit an image
of economic perfection nor transforming it in line with a utopia of demo-
cratic participation comports with the complexity of modem business.
Forcing the world into rigid theoretical boxes is dangerous. Instead, a search
for new directions in corporate law would do better to explore particular
areas of the subject and consider carefully how best to achieve the most
desirable social policy in each area. Usually, a mix of economic, political,
and moral principles, in different measures for different circumstances, will
provide the most suitable recipe. Wise policymakers-not only legislatures
and courts, but also academics and public-spirited lawyers and citizens-
should not convert the framework of corporate law into either an unfeeling
gauntlet of economic madness nor an overly sanguine vision of do-good
business. New directions in corporate law should instead take society on a
course that is morally and politically uplifting, as well as economically
productive. Corporate law must remain complex to retain its legitimacy.
1199-1203 (1993). But see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1423-24 &
n.2, 1435 n.40 (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 61 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1034, 1054 n.108 (1993) (expressing doubt about
long-term significance of these two trends and arguing that much of the debate over "new
directions in corporate law" is not really "new").
1993] 1623

